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TURNING THE KALEIDOSCOPE: TOWARD A 
THEORY OF INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 
CRAIG GREEN* 
Scholars, judges, and lawyers have fought for decades over 
originalism, textualism, and “living” interpretation as though 
such questions arose exclusively with respect to statutes and 
constitutions. That is wrong. Some judicial decisions have 
meanings that change over time, much like statutory and 
constitutional provisions, and sometimes interpreting a case 
requires more than reading an opinion’s text. Legal actors 
constantly fight over what precedents mean, and those disputes 
require an understanding of what such cases meant in the past—
whether at the initial time of decision, or in their subsequent 
applications. As with statutes and the Constitution, links to a 
historical past can be important evidence that precedential 
interpreters are applying extant legal authority, rather than 
making it up. This Article offers a system for interpreting judicial 
precedents that clarifies how current fights unfold and identifies 
techniques for future use. 
I consider four methods of interpreting precedents that rely on 
different categories of historical materials and can generate 
different interpretive results: (i) an opinion’s text, which indicates 
a decision’s declared meaning; (ii) adjudicative context, reflecting 
its implied meaning; (iii) reception by contemporary analysts, 
depicting its understood meaning; and (iv) subsequent doctrinal 
applications, which identify its developmental meaning. These 
categories–much like the textualism, originalism, and dynamism 
that are familiar in other legal contexts–yield interpretive options 
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for lawyers defending clients, courts explaining decisions, and 
intellectuals pursuing truth. 
This Article illustrates how the foregoing methods work, and also 
what they produce, by considering important precedents from the 
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. Two examples, 
Swift v. Tyson and Erie v. Tompkins, are among the most widely 
studied cases in American law, yet the application of different 
interpretive techniques reveals new historical materials that in 
turn support new interpretations. 
By comparison, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in United 
States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges are uncharted 
territory, with only scant historical evidence at hand. In the latter 
context, methods of precedential interpretation sketch a range of 
options by which legal actors may influence and solidify such 
decisions’ meanings. Whether interpretive methodologies are 
used for revisionist purposes or for explicitly creative ones, they 
can be powerful tools for analyzing any judicial decision that is 
deemed important enough to merit the effort—just as occurs with 
statutory and constitutional provisions. 
No interpretive system can produce simple doctrinal solutions to 
hard legal problems; indeed, that impenetrability is what makes 
hard problems hard. Understanding interpretive methodologies 
can nevertheless identify techniques that legal actors use to 
manipulate precedents’ legal power. It can also offer fresh 
intellectual perspective on how law operates, and why law’s 
history is so hard to escape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All first-year law students are told that they must learn how to 
“read cases,” and every trained lawyer claims to be skilled in doing 
so. Yet methodological questions of how to interpret judicial 
decisions are widely ignored.1 To introduce the obvious-but-strange 
subject of interpreting precedents, one might begin with a contrast to 
the well-known fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
 
 1. See Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1626 
(2013) (describing current inattention to precedential interpretation as “astonishing”); see 
also Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 183 (2014) 
(“Perspectives on the scope of precedent are	.	.	.	intertwined with deeper principles of 
interpretation and adjudication.”); cf. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2007) (“In the United States	.	.	.	the common law is 
embarking on a path towards becoming increasingly textual, just as statutes have been for 
hundreds of years.	.	.	.	As a consequence, legal reasoning is gradually being supplanted by 
close reading.”). Important scholarly debates about dicta, and about standards for overruling 
cases, have not addressed the interpretation of entities that do qualify as binding judicial 
decisions. E.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 3–8 (2008) (discussing 
ideologies that affect decisions to overrule prior cases); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell 
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1044–75 (2005) (analyzing schemes for 
identifying dicta and holdings). 
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Lawyers have debated for decades which methods and sources to 
use in interpreting statutes and constitutions.2 Labels such as 
textualism, original intent, original meaning, and “living” dynamism 
are almost clichés in these contexts, as they represent theoretical 
positions that are familiar and powerful.3 Although modern 
interpreters seldom commit to one mode of constitutional or statutory 
interpretation as universally correct, debates over interpretive 
methodologies have framed a generation of legal thought.4 For 
example, litigation about the Voting Rights Act or constitutional 
privacy cannot be altogether limited to narrow substantive topics; 
interpretive methodologies connect such disputes to broader concepts 
of legal authority and judicial power.5 Can old statutes have new 
meanings, and if so, how? Is the Constitution’s meaning fixed, and if 
so, by what? These systematic inquiries are rare when it comes to 
interpreting judicial decisions.6 Vague and authoritative precedents, 
however, often require every bit as much interpretation as vague and 
 
 2. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9 
(1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 9–15 (1997). 
 3. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011); ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
For political consequences of interpretive methodologies, compare STEVEN M. TELES, 
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF 
THE LAW (2008), with JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE 
NATION HE MADE (2006). 
 4. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of 
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 8–48 (2014) (discussing prevalent and 
longstanding attention to interpretive methodology with respect to statutes and the 
Constitution). In practice, even insistent originalists sometimes derive their conclusions 
from modern sociology more than framing-era history. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772–82 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(advocating a “colorblind Constitution” under the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 
without citing any supportive authority older than Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and relying instead upon nonoriginalist precedents from 
the middle- and late-twentieth century).  
 5. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
631, 665–66 (discussing connections between the Court’s privacy decisions and 
“conceptual difficulties with originalism as a constitutional methodology”); Jane S. 
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 54–56 (1998) (analyzing voting rights cases, among others, to “confound the 
familiar interpretive dichotomies between textualism and intentionalism, originalism and 
the common law mode”). 
 6. Future research might explore why questions of interpretive methodology have 
been important for statutes and constitutions, but not for precedents. Cf. Craig Green, An 
Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009) (describing twentieth-
century debates over judicial role). 
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authoritative statutes or constitutional provisions. In all three 
contexts, the need for advanced interpretive techniques arises 
whenever a legal authority is doctrinally powerful, yet is 
simulaneously unclear with respect to some question of great 
importance.7 
This Article explores how sophisticated lawyers interpret iconic 
precedents and illustrates why those methods are important.8 The 
term “iconic precedents” is intended as a rough placeholder to 
identify decisions that are so important that special techniques are 
required to grasp their meaning. American principles of stare decisis 
purport to treat most cases equally, as decisions are published in the 
same reporters and databases, with supposedly comparable power to 
bind future judgments.9 In practice, however, that equality is merely 
formal. A few cases—one may call them “iconic”—tower in 
significance while the rest go mainly unnoticed.10 At different points 
 
 7. For example, extensive interpretive efforts will be deemed unnecessary if a legal 
authority is trivially important, or if it unambiguously resolves appurtenant doctrinal 
questions. We shall see, as a practical matter, that advanced interpretative techniques are 
applied to only some precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions. See infra notes 8, 
10, 13. 
 8. “Sophisticated lawyer” is a necessarily imprecise term that denotes all judges, 
academics, and practitioners who are able to self-consciously navigate matters of 
interpretive methodology. In some areas of legal practice, time and resource constraints 
will affect whether that category is small or large in number. 
 9. Tiersma, supra note 1, at 1278. 
 10. The term “iconic case” identifies decisions that represent fundamental aspects of a 
legal system and whose meaning necessarily extends beyond the adjudicator’s explanatory 
opinion. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “iconic” as “[d]esignating a person or thing 
regarded as representative of a culture or movement; important or influential in a particular 
(cultural) context.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2006), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/90882?redirectedFrom=iconic#eid [https://perma.cc/QL2F-GG7W?type=image]. Particular 
determinations about which cases qualify as iconic raise debatable issues of legal culture that 
change over time, just as is the case with debates over a specific precedent’s meaning. Readers 
must not allow historical variety among iconic cases—much less quibbles over borderline 
examples—to distract from the thesis that some cases are different from others with respect to 
(a) their power and (b) their corresponding interpretive techniques. If some readers wished to 
advocate a third category of “semi-iconic cases,” or to array cases along an “iconic spectrum,” 
that would have no large effect on my approach. This Article is less concerned with identifying 
iconic cases on a list, or drawing clear lines around the set, than with analyzing fundamental 
relationships between precedential power and interpretive technique. Cf. DANIEL T. 
RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE 
INDEPENDENCE 16 (1987) (“These are at best exemplars of the ways in which a certain, 
powerful class of words have functioned in our political culture.	.	.	.	[T]here is something to be 
said for a serious look	.	.	.	at a few of the most potent tools and expansive political metaphors 
we have possessed.	.	.	.	The words we use	.	.	.	have been made, remade, repudiated, fought 
over.	.	.	.	The keywords, the metaphors, the self-evident truths of our politics have mattered 
too deeply for us to use them in any but contested ways.”). 
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in time, iconic cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan, Brown, 
Korematsu, Lochner, Dred Scott, and Marbury have been 
authoritative, controversial, or reviled, but their persistent cultural 
potency explains why they produce ongoing interpretive struggles.11 
By comparison, the noniconic decisions that were published 
immediately before and after Marbury or Brown are doctrinally 
unimportant and forgotten—along with the overwhelming majority of 
other judicial rulings.12 If thousands of ordinary decisions were erased 
from research databases, hardly anyone but specialists would care or 
even notice.13 
 
  Readers may notice a parallel between this account of iconic cases and the 
interpretation of comparably “iconic” statutory or constitutional provisions. See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001). 
Methodological disputes about statutory and constitutional interpretation do not analyze 
simple, clear, and unimportant legal authorities. See supra note 7. No sensible person 
would fight over originalism or dynamism in trying to understand “two Senators,” U.S. 
CONST.	art.	I, §	3, or “the State of Arizona,” 25 U.S.C. §	463c (2012). Statutory and 
constitutional methodologies become salient only with respect to vague phrases like “due 
process” or “employment discrimination,” which themselves are sufficiently important to 
justify interpretive struggle. The same is true with respect to interpretive methodologies 
concerning precedents. Perhaps obviously, “vagueness” in any form of legal authority 
must be defined in operation rather than the abstract, as it depends entirely on context 
and the legal questions under dispute. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–92 
(2015) (discussing whether the ostensibly unambiguous clause “established by the State” 
was vague as applied to insurance exchanges under the Affordable Care Act). 
 11. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.	XIV; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803). Modern disputes over what these landmark cases signify for current 
legal problems are too many for adequate citation. E.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 528–33 (2015) (introducing a 
“nascent rebirth of mainstream conservative support for judicial protection of 
unenumerated economic rights”); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3081 (2014) (essay) (discussing “a potential 
revival of Brown’s lost logic in the context of same-sex marriage”). 
 12. For trivia buffs, the distinctly noniconic cases published before and after Marbury 
are Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117 (1801), and Clark v. Young, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
181 (1803). The slightly more well-known cases surrounding Brown are Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955), and Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 
(1955). 
 13. The radical unevenness of precedents’ importance has been a dominant feature of 
Anglo-American law for more than a century. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) (“The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a 
generation take up pretty much the whole body of the law	.	.	.	.	We could reconstruct the 
corpus from them if all that went before were burned.”). That characteristic is also a 
premise of American legal education, as the very first casebook proposed to take “a 
branch of the law	.	.	.	and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, 
classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the 
 
94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016) 
2015] INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 385 
The importance of iconic cases is what fuels controversy over 
their interpretation and status. Landmark rulings often renounce or 
reformulate prior practice, and where these shifts have special 
significance, they demand unusual methods of interpretation and 
justification. Ordinary cases can be explained with a string-cite or 
headnote, but to fully understand Brown or Marbury would take a 
library and a lifetime. 
This Article systemizes interpretation of iconic cases using four 
kinds of historical material and four types of precedential meaning: (i) 
an opinion’s text indicates a decision’s declared meaning; (ii) 
adjudicative context reflects a precedent’s implied meaning; (iii) 
reception by contemporary analysts depicts understood meaning; and 
(iv) later applications identify developmental meaning. As with other 
kinds of textualism (declared meaning), originalism (implied and 
understood meaning), and dynamic legalism (developmental 
meaning), historical materials concerning precedents often point in 
 
growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines.” 1 C.C. 
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii (Bos., Little, 
Brown & Co. 1871). The notion that one could describe or learn about some expansive 
and longstanding field of law from a few dozen cases and a few hundred pages depends on 
the prior assumption that “leading” or “landmark” precedents are the ones that matter 
most. See id. at vi–vii (“The most important element [in selecting cases]	.	.	.	was the great 
and rapidly increasing number of reported cases in every department of law.	.	.	.	[T]he 
shortest and best	.	.	.	way of mastering	.	.	.	doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in 
which it is embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this 
purpose	.	.	.	bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast 
majority are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study.	.	.	.	[T]he 
many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its 
appearance	.	.	.	[are] the cause of much misapprehension.”). Culturally constructed 
techniques of doctrinal analysis taught in law school continue to affect the behavior of 
alumni as they become practicing lawyers and judges. Especially because the latter groups 
tend to face even more urgent deadlines and resource constraints than are present in law 
school research, a few cases tend to matter a lot, and the devil may take the rest. 
  Physical collections of case reporters once made it easier to visualize just how 
many insignificant decisions are formally part of the United States legal system, though 
even those tens of thousands of physical volumes with published cases omitted nearly all 
trial court decisions and cases that ended in settlement or plea agreement. Perhaps twenty-
first-century lawyers should imagine the results screen from a search of all state and 
federal decisions for all electronically available cases that include the words “of” or “and.” 
With a great deal of time and money, a sophisticated empiricist might be able to estimate 
the fraction of total judicial decisions that have ever been cited anywhere by anyone. But 
any practical lawyer who has drafted a brief or judicial opinion would further stress that 
only a small fraction of even cited cases is actually meaningful, much less irreplaceable. 
The dismissiveness expressed by Holmes and Langdell regarding the significance of most 
judicial cases during the first decades of printed reporters seems immensely more 
warranted in present times of electronic research and resources. 
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different directions, as they unseat or reinforce interpretations that 
otherwise seem conventional. 
Where the foregoing evidence does not fit neatly into a single 
interpretation, fracture-points emerge that lawyers, judges, and 
academics can use in modern struggles over precedential 
interpretation and authority. Any system of interpreting cases must 
therefore describe a world of contested opportunities rather than one 
of simple doctrinal answers.14 These four categories of evidence 
demonstrate that there is no meaningful choice about whether to use 
history in precedential interpretation. “The only legal materials that 
are or ever have been or ever will be available are historical—cases 
that have already been decided, statutes that have already been 
enacted, and so on.”15 Instead, more interesting questions are what 
kinds of history to use and how. We shall see that to study 
methodologies for interpreting iconic cases will clarify the 
relationship between law and history, as well as the professional 
classifications of legal history and legal practice.16 
Iconic cases lead double lives. In one respect, they are simply 
historical events that occur at specific times and derive from 
particular people, environments, ideas, and interests.17 An iconic 
 
 14. As Bordieu has written, “[n]othing is more paradoxical	.	.	.	than [for] people 
whose whole life is spent fighting over words [to] strive at all costs to fix	.	.	.	the one true 
meaning of	.	.	.	ambiguous, overdetermined or indeterminate symbols, words, texts or 
events” that “generate interest [precisely] because they have always been at stake in 
struggles	.	.	.	[over] their ‘true’ meaning.” PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 
17 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 1990) (1980) (observing that this paradox recurs for 
“all sacred texts, which, being invested with a collective authority	.	.	.	can be used as the 
tools of a recognized power	.	.	.	through interpretation”). Against that backdrop, I should 
stress that the categories listed here are not exhaustive, nor are they necessarily listed in 
sequential importance. Even as interpreters debate whether a particular case qualifies as 
iconic, see supra note 10, they might also debate which interpretive methodologies should 
apply to iconic cases, as well as whether one category of evidence is more persuasive than 
another. 
 15. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 146 n.6 (1977). 
 16. For an analogous discussion of jurisprudential canons, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Legal Canons: An Introduction, in LEGAL CANONS 3, 3–32 (J.M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson eds., 2000). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the 
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as a Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1000 
n.11 (1992) (“Judicial precedents, like religious icons, develop their own tradition of faith, 
having independent meaning.”). The main influence on my view of law as a cultural 
product, however, is Dan Rodgers’s transformative scholarship on the relationships 
between ideas and material realities. See, e.g., CULTURES IN MOTION (Daniel T. Rodgers 
et al. eds., 2014); RODGERS, supra note 10. 
 17. See Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A 
Historical Narrative, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911, 912 (2000). 
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decision’s historical reality can be discussed with different emphases: 
political histories link cases to partisan struggles, while economic 
histories focus on material conditions, and intellectual histories 
explore ideologies. These and other modes of analysis are judged by 
prevailing standards of expertise, sophistication, and connection to 
other scholarship.18 For professional historians, categories of 
precedential meaning (declared, implied, understood, developmental) 
are data points to be used in support of narratives that other 
historians and intellectuals may appreciate as nuanced, truthful, well 
crafted, and above all else, interesting. 
In a second sense, however, judicial precedents are more than 
academic objects; they are conduits of power that influence current 
legal disputes and violence.19 In this operative reality, cases have a 
formal status—affirmed, overruled, revised—and they have a 
doctrinal meaning that changes over time. An iconic decision like 
Carroll Towing is not just a past event; it prescribes current standards 
for tortious negligence, just as Lochner today is a cautionary tale 
about the discredited freedom of contract.20 For professional legal 
communities, analyzing iconic cases is more than a historical exercise, 
and standards for evaluating precedential interpretation are more 
practical than intellectual. Lawyers and judges use categories of 
precedential meaning as tools to persuade legal audiences that some 
disputed doctrinal result is correct in the present tense. 
Any system of precedent implies that judicial decisions must be 
understood. As legal authorities, precedents can be authoritative only 
if they are legible and portable.21 If a decision is opaque or 
understood solely by marginal elites, that precedent can have only 
limited effect.22 If judicial decisions from the past are supposed to 
 
 18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Losing One’s Head: Judges and the Law in 
Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253 (1999) (book 
review); Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, 
Justification, and Explanation, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 323 (2004). 
 19. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628 (1986). 
 20. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–18 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (discussing Lochner’s modern status); Loera v. United States, 714 F.3d 1025, 
1031–32 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d 
Cir. 1947)). 
 21. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO 
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 218–21 (1998); Michel Foucault, 
Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 87–89 
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
 22. Imagine Hammurabi’s Code in a language that only he could read. See Kathryn E. 
Slanski, The Law of Hammurabi and Its Audience, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (2012). 
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channel current legal force, they must be able to transport ideas and 
instructions from one context to another, thus synchronizing the 
activities of officials, lawyers, and actors who are dispersed across 
space and time.23 
Judicial decisions’ historical and operative aspects are equally 
important. Indeed, the two cannot be separated without undermining 
the premise of all precedential systems: that present legal power is 
guided by history’s dead hand.24 In practice, however, the past and 
present meanings of iconic decisions diverge. Each is constructed 
using different techniques in the service of different goals. By 
examining links between iconic cases’ historical and current 
significance, this Article builds a template for comprehending the 
long, porous border between law and history—a border that is critical 
for lawyers and historians alike. 
This Article proceeds in three steps. Part I applies my approach 
to two historical icons, Erie v. Tompkins and Swift v. Tyson.25 The 
four categories of interpretive material discussed supra will show that 
beliefs about these well-known cases are upside down. Modern 
lawyers tend to view Swift as an instance of untrammeled power that 
contrasts with Erie’s judicial restraint,26 but historical analysis reveals 
the opposite. In the 1840s, Swift located judicial authority in a 
carefully crafted network of precedents and authorities that formed 
an aspirationally cohesive system. In the 1930s, by comparison, Erie 
applied brute judicial force to establish a self-consciously novel 
regime of authority with meager explanation. The fact that Erie’s 
adventurism was accepted at the time speaks volumes about the New 
Deal Court’s approach to constitutional law, and more broadly about 
iconic precedents’ disruptive power. 
Part II briefly examines United States v. Windsor, which 
invalidated a key section of the Defense of Marriage Act, and 
 
 23. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIL 
IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA 1580–1865, at 68–70 (2010). 
 24. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing first 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921); and then 
citing Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 
16) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such 
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); 
GILMORE, supra note 15, at 14. 
 25. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 26. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment 
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1448 n.52 (1997). 
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Obergefell v. Hodges, which invalidated state restrictions on same-sex 
marriage.27 Windsor and Obergefell addressed the greatest civil rights 
issue in a generation, but in both circumstances the Court’s 
explanation left unresolved important ambiguities.28 This 
juxtaposition of great doctrinal importance with unclear explanation 
is the defining feature of icons like Brown or Erie, and that same 
characteristic is what justifies unusual methods of precedential 
interpretation with respect to more recent cases. 
No one can know whether Windsor or Obergefell will retain their 
iconic status—and each case has a much slimmer historical record 
than Swift or Erie—but both decisions are useful examples for 
studying interpretive methodologies. The Court’s incomplete 
opinions suggest that future interpreters will conduct their own fights 
over what the decisions mean by using nontextual tools, such as 
adjudicative context, contemporary reception, and subsequent 
applications. Regardless of whether either precedent endures as an 
icon, Windsor and Obergefell thus illustrate this Article’s relevance 
for any past, present, or future case where a judicial opinion, standing 
alone, seems inadequate to explain the decision’s legal significance. 
Part III concludes by discussing the relationship between 
techniques of legal history and preconditions for transmitting legal 
power.29 Having described a system for interpreting iconic precedents, 
this Part notes the limited goals that such systems can achieve. The 
double lives of iconic cases embody a schism in our legal order. On 
one hand, imperatives of doctrinal effectiveness often simplify 
historical realities in order to effectuate the rule of law. On the other 
hand, inaccurate caricatures of the past may risk exposure of 
precedential interpretations as historically inauthentic and thus 
illegitimate. Legal doctrine and legal history—despite and because of 
their incommensurabilities—are thus revealed as equally crucial 
elements of American precedentialism. 
 
 27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2604–05 (2015) (invalidating same-sex 
marriage laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee); United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-199, §	3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. §	7 (2012))). 
 28. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay 
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 873 (2014). 
 29. See supra notes 17–18, 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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I.  ERIE’S MANY MEANINGS 
Erie is an ideal context for studying precedential interpretation 
because, as we shall see, the decision’s iconic status has emerged 
through layers of historical misunderstanding. Most Erie scholarship 
today defends the Court’s decision as properly revered, or assumes 
that a defense is unnecessary.30 These writings are interesting on their 
own terms, and they illustrate how Erie is continually rebuilt for 
modern audiences. But their ahistorical approach cannot explain what 
Erie meant at the time it happened, nor can they describe how the 
Erie of 1938 became the iconic “Erie” that is so well known today. 
To understand Erie in its own time requires understanding its 
nemesis Swift, and this Article’s interpretive methods will be similar 
for both decisions. Applying precedential textualism, I will look first 
to the Justices’ written opinions, which demonstrate each case’s 
declared meaning. Then, I will use precedential originalism to 
contextualize those words with information about the lawyers and 
 
 30. Compare Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2013) (“This article seeks primarily to rescue Erie from its 
academic critics.”), with Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 
(2008) [hereinafter Green, Repressing Erie] (“Erie’s bare holding	.	.	.	is established beyond 
boredom, and this Article will not dispute it.”), and Craig Green, Erie and Problems of 
Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 669 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Constitutional 
Structure] (“With Erie’s doctrinal future secure, can anyone still muster energy to debate 
whether the decision has a valid constitutional basis?”). See also Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 870, 
872 (2007) (insisting that Erie is “of central importance in determining whether and to what 
extent [customary international law] has the status of federal common law”); Henry J. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
386 (1964) (“[T]he constitutional ground taken in Erie was precisely the right ground	.	.	.	.”); 
Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 
1685–86 (1974) (defending Erie as “constitutional” because it “rests upon premises related to 
the basic nature of our federal system”). 
 Exceptions to the ahistorical mainstream include TONY FREYER, HARMONY & 
DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981) 
[hereinafter FREYER, HARMONY]; TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1979) [hereinafter FREYER, 
FORUMS]; EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: 
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter PURCELL, BRANDEIS]; and 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992) [hereinafter PURCELL, 
LITIGATION]. For other historically oriented works, see RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH 
U. WHITTEN, CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE 
DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977); GILMORE, supra 
note 15; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 
at 245–52 (1977); and Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 
(1978). 
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judges (implied meaning), and with the decisions’ contemporary 
reception by various commentators (understood meaning). Finally, I 
will apply methods of living precedentialism to examine the cases’ 
application in subsequent judicial decisions and scholarship 
(developmental meaning). Although particular historical materials will 
obviously be different for Swift and Erie, each category of historical 
evidence presents another dimension of what the two cases meant 
over time, and the materials reveal more interpretive cracks than 
coherence. The discussion herein illustrates how new interpretive 
techniques can uncover new categories of historical evidence, and 
how that new evidence can generate new doctrinal interpretations. It 
offers a novel exegesis of two familiar cases, while also charting a 
general pattern for interpreting any precedent that modern legal 
actors deem to be important and controversial.31 
A. Swift v. Tyson: Creating a Monster 
The only thing most lawyers know about Swift is that Erie 
overruled it. To ignore Swift, however, overlooks an enormous 
amount. For example, Swift’s unanimous result was explained by 
Justice Joseph Story, a dominant judicial figure and arguably 
America’s greatest conflicts scholar.32 We shall see that Swift was 
probably more orthodox in its time than Erie is today.33 To grasp why 
Swift would become outrageous, we must first consider the long 
period in which it was normal. 
In 1842, Swift was not primarily about judicial power or 
federalism; it was about negotiable paper and commerce.34 John Swift 
sued in New York federal court to enforce payment on a bill of 
exchange. The bill embodied George Tyson’s promise to pay two 
speculators for offering Tyson the option to buy certain real estate. 
The speculators later gave Tyson’s payment obligation to Swift, and 
in return, Swift agreed to cancel debts that the speculators owed 
him.35 
When Swift sought payment on the bill of exchange, Tyson 
refused because the original property deal was a fraud. Tyson claimed 
that the speculators’ trickery voided Swift’s right to collect, but Swift 
 
 31. See supra note 10 (explaining what makes such precedents “iconic”). 
 32. BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 30, at 123. 
 33. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN 
OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 336 (1985). 
 34. See, e.g., FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 1–43. 
 35. Id. at 5. 
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demanded payment because he had paid valuable consideration and 
knew nothing about the speculators’ misdeeds. Tyson replied that 
Swift had not paid “consideration” for the bill of exchange because, 
under New York state-court cases, speculators’ preexisting debts did 
not qualify.36 
1.  Textualism: Declared Meaning 
Interpreting Swift starts with the declared meaning in the Court’s 
opinion. From this textualist viewpoint, Swift was a minor case that 
addressed one issue of commercial law and one point of statutory law. 
The Court’s “only real question” was whether cancelling Swift’s debt 
should qualify as valuable consideration—like cash—“in the sense of 
the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments.”37 New York 
precedents were split, with recent decisions favoring Tyson’s stance 
but an opinion authored by Chancellor James Kent supporting 
Swift’s.38 Decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United 
States Supreme Court, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and England, had 
endorsed Swift’s legal theory by treating the cancellation of prior 
debts as equivalent to cash.39 
Swift’s grab bag of authority from various jurisdictions bolstered 
the Court’s own judgment that a canceled prior debt should count as 
valid consideration. “It is for the benefit and convenience of the 
commercial world, to give as wide an extent as practicable to the 
credit and circulation of negotiable paper	.	.	.	.”40 A rule granting 
payment to Swift would have allowed creditors to get satisfaction 
from debtors without resorting to litigation.41 More importantly, a 
pro-Swift ruling would have let people like Tyson create negotiable 
instruments “of equivalent value to cash,” without paying a premium 
to compensate for those instruments’ limited alienability.42 This would 
have allowed such credit instruments to circulate more freely in 
 
 36. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 15–16 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 37. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 16–18, 22 (collecting sources). 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. See id. at 6 (statement of Swift’s counsel). For example, Swift would not have to 
sue the speculators to recover their preexisting debt; he could accept their bill of exchange 
as payment. 
 42. Id. at 20. 
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mercantile business transactions, thereby promoting “the benefit and 
convenience of the commercial world.”43 
In contrast, the Court feared that a victory for Tyson could ruin 
negotiable instruments for the “large class of cases” where banks 
discount “old securities	.	.	.	which have arrived at maturity” in 
exchange for debtors’ proffer of “new notes	.	.	.	by way of renewal or 
security.”44 The Court wrote that “[p]robably more than one-half of 
all bank transactions in our country, as well as those of other 
countries, are of this nature. [Tyson’s proposed doctrine] would strike 
a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing 
debts.”45 In theory, Tyson’s arguments would require banks to 
investigate whether a third party’s bill of exchange, when offered to 
cover existing debt, was obtained through inequitable conduct. In 
practice, however, that investigation would be so costly that creditors 
would have to price bills of exchange “at a ruinous discount” to cover 
risks that subsequent holders like Swift might be unable to collect.46 
Only one page in Swift discussed the issue that would someday 
be notorious: “[A]dmitting the doctrine [of refusing payment] to be 
fully settled in New York, it remains to be considered, whether it is 
obligatory upon this Court, if it differs from	.	.	.	the general 
commercial law.”47 There was no doubt at the time that “general 
commercial law” existed, and it certainly applied to bills of exchange. 
This is why the Court cited so many cases—including New York 
decisions—in which judges had analyzed bills of exchange without 
relying on “any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local 
usage[;]	.	.	.	they [instead deduced their results] from the general 
principles of commercial law.”48 A major goal of commercial law was 
to allow merchants to operate within a developed system of trade, 
and American courts were uniformly glad to oblige in this context by 
applying nationally and internationally harmonized legal doctrines.49 
The narrow question in Swift was whether federal courts were 
required to follow New York courts’ interpretation of general 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 18. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text; infra notes 128–138 and 
accompanying text (discussing Swift’s efforts to accomplish such objectives); infra notes 
128–138 (discussing similar efforts by New York courts in Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93 
(N.Y. 1843) (Walworth, Ch.)). 
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commercial law, even when the latter seemed demonstrably incorrect 
on the merits. 
The statutory question in Swift concerned the First Congress’s 
Rules of Decision Act, which ordered that “the laws of the several 
states	.	.	.	shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law 
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”50 Swift 
held that, in this context, the statutory term “laws” excluded judicial 
interpretations of general commercial law.51 Nineteenth-century 
common law assumed that judges did not make law from whole cloth; 
instead, adjudicators sought to apply preexisting authorities such as 
precedents, customs, traditions, and widespread notions of reason and 
justice.52 Within that tradition, judicial decisions were, “at most, only 
evidence of what the laws [were]; and [were] not of themselves 
laws.”53 Further, Swift reasoned that even though precedents “are 
often reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves,” 
one could not use the singular noun to say that any new judicial ruling 
was itself a new “law.”54 
Instead, Swift interpreted “laws of the several states” to mean 
“rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority [of a 
state], or long established local customs having the force of laws.”55 
The Court held that constitutional, statutory, and local customary law 
embodied the kind of fiat-based, localized authority that Congress 
had wanted federal courts to follow; judicial decisions about 
commercial law, however, did not.56 
Prior Supreme Court decisions had applied the Rules of Decision 
Act only to “positive statutes of the state, and the construction 
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to 
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real 
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their 
nature and character.”57 Swift saw no reason—absent explicit 
 
 50. Judiciary (Rules of Decision) Act of 1789, ch. 20, §	34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §	1652 (2012)). 
 51. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19. 
 52. Cf. id. at 19 (“[S]tate tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as 
ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true 
exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles 
of commercial law to govern the case.”). 
 53. Id. at 18. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 18–19. 
 57. Id. I have not found direct evidence that Swift intended to reference slavery with 
its term “intraterritorial in their nature.” During the same year, however, Justice Story 
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congressional instruction—that the Rules of Decision Act should 
govern “questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent 
upon local statutes or local usages.”58 Swift thus concluded that New 
York courts’ interpretation of general commercial law, if 
substantively incorrect, should not prohibit federal courts from 
reaching a different result. 
As a matter of declared meaning, Swift’s judicial text portrays an 
almost boring decision. The Court described its commercial-law 
ruling as consistent with the bulk of prior case law and unbroken 
business practice. Perhaps even New York state courts would fall into 
line soon. For although Swift’s interpretation of general commercial 
law never required state courts to follow federal outcomes, the Court 
believed that tradition and good sense would prevail, thereby leading 
state tribunals sooner or later to enforce bills of exchange like Tyson’s 
as well.59 
2.  Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings 
Every lawyer knows that written judicial opinions are an 
accessible resource for interpreting what a case means, as published 
reporters offer highly legible and portable justifications for many 
courts’ decreed results. The unstated context of a judicial decision, 
however, can be important if legal interpreters deem the published 
opinion to be unsatisfying or incomplete. In Swift, for example, details 
 
wrote the Court’s opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), which 
came rather close to that conclusion: 
By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, 
as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in opposition 
to its own policy and institutions, in favour of the subjects of other nations where 
slavery is recognized	.	.	.	.	The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal 
regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws. 
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611 (emphasis added). For political reasons and otherwise, it 
may have been vital for Swift to hold that federal judges in diversity cases would not opine 
about how “general common law” would regulate slavery—or even abolish it. See also, 
e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 346–47, 354 (documenting Justice Story’s role in 
developing the law surrounding slavery). 
 58. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19. 
 59. Perhaps ironically, Justice Catron’s concurrence showed most clearly the Court’s 
expectation that state courts would change their minds in response to Swift. Catron 
objected that part of the majority’s holding was dictum, and that it was “improbable” that 
contrary state courts would “yield to a mere expression of opinion of this Court.” Id. at 23 
(Catron, J., concurring) (emphasis added). By contrast, “if the question [addressed in 
dictum] was permitted to rest until it fairly arose, the decision of it either way by this 
Court, probably, would, and I think ought to settle it.” Id. 
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about the lawyers and the authoring judge support interpretations of 
“implied meaning” that diverge from the opinion’s published text. 
Further complexities appear by examining Swift’s audience for the 
decision’s “understood meaning” when it was rendered. The 
following subsections consider all of these agents who produced 
originalist interpretive material: lawyers and judges for implied 
meaning, and contemporary observers for understood meaning. 
a. Lawyers60 
Though the Supreme Court explained Swift as a decision of only 
middling importance, the lawyers representing Swift and Tyson 
argued as if it were monumental. Swift’s lawyer, William Pitt 
Fessenden, emphasized the importance of commercial policy and 
celebrated negotiable paper’s “great[] service to civilized man, in 
facilitating the transmission of the equivalent of money, and 
thus,	.	.	.	answering, in some respects, the purposes of money itself.”61 
For Fessenden, the Swift case threatened the basic stability of 
America’s monetary system. Although negotiable securities might be 
hard for some modern readers to appreciate as an alternative to 
specie currency, (consider bitcoin or credit cards), that function would 
have been painfully clear in the year 1842.62 
The unspoken background for Fessenden’s argument was the 
Panic of 1837, which had left the country with years of double-dipped 
aftershocks in what would be the economy’s worst downturn until the 
Great Depression.63 Unstable banks and securities prompted many 
 
 60. Twenty-first-century readers might instinctively doubt whether lawyers’ 
arguments can illuminate the meaning of judicial decisions. This is because today’s lawyers 
only rarely quote briefs or oral arguments to support particular interpretations of court 
decisions. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 747 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (interpreting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), based on arguments made by the lawyers litigating in 1954), with Adam Liptak, 
The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24 (quoting those 
same lawyers in 2007 decrying the Chief Justice’s conclusions about Brown as “100 
percent wrong,” “preposterous,” and “dirty pool”). In the 1840s, however, lawyers’ 
arguments were so important that they were printed in advance of the judges’ opinions. 
E.g., Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 3–14. Unless one were to insist on some form of 
precedential hypertextualism—the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text—lawyers’ 
arguments can offer a very useful source of contextual meaning. 
 61. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 7 (statement of Swift’s counsel). 
 62. James A. Henretta, The “Market” in the Early Republic, 18 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 
289, 297–98 (1998) (“[M]ost American money was not	.	.	.	gold or silver, but ‘token’ or 
artificial money	.	.	.	.”); see FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 5, 36. 
 63. ALASDAIR ROBERTS, AMERICA’S FIRST GREAT DEPRESSION: ECONOMIC 
CRISIS AND DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837, at 7–8 (2012) (“[The years 1836–48] 
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commercial actors to demand cash instead of accepting credit.64 Those 
refusals to accept financial notes shrank the effective money supply 
and prompted deflation. As money became more scarce and valuable, 
the price of everything else dropped. A smaller quantity of 
decreasingly available, increasingly valuable money was able to buy 
more goods, services, property, and labor. And as prices fell, 
employers and consumers cut salaries and spending, which again 
reduced the money in people’s pockets and reinforced deflationary 
pressure.65 
Fessenden claimed that to adopt Swift’s position would reduce 
litigation because already “thousands of suits have been prevented by 
receiving a bill of exchange or promissory note,	.	.	.	in discharge of a 
debt, which	.	.	.	the debtor	.	.	.	could discharge in no other way.”66 
Fessenden’s deeper argument, however, was about economic 
confidence. He implied that any refusal to accept commercial notes as 
equivalent to cash would undermine the desirability and circulation of 
credit instruments, thereby echoing the deflationary economic crisis 
that continued to devastate so many Americans.67 
 
began with the collapse	.	.	.	and panic that caused	.	.	.	a ‘paralysis of credit’ among U.S. 
financial institutions.	.	.	.	By 1843, the United States was frozen out of international 
financial markets.	.	.	.	Economic decline unleashed civil and political disorder and caused 
an unraveling of the unwritten compact that held the federal system together.	.	.	.	[I]f we 
measure a crisis by	.	.	.	political and cultural shock	.	.	.	as well as by	.	.	.	economic 
dislocation, then the crisis of 1836–1848 is clearly a rival to the depression of the 1930s.”); 
Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J. 
ECON. HIST. 457, 486 (2002) (“The Panic of 1837 was the culmination of a series of policy 
shifts and unanticipated disturbances that shook the young U.S. economy at the core of its 
financial structure	.	.	.	.”). 
 64. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 47 (“[By 1842], two hundred banks had closed 
entirely. In the interim, economic activity ground to a halt. Money became scarce, and 
prices and trade declined precipitously.”). 
 65. JESSICA M. LEPLER, THE MANY PANICS OF 1837: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE 
CREATION OF A TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 231 (2013) (“Nine states defaulted 
on their loans. Foreign investors feared a general repudiation of state debts and drastically 
reduced the flow of capital and credit to the United States.	.	.	.	Although the actual crisis in 
1837 was more acute, the Panic in 1839 brought on the worst deflation Americans had yet 
experienced. The English called the years that followed ‘the hungry forties.’	” (footnotes 
omitted) (citing first REGINALD CHARLES MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND 
AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 265–69 (2013); then citing Namsuk Kim & John Joseph Wallis, 
The Market for American State Government Bonds in Britain and the United States, 1830–
43, 58 ECON. HIST. REV. 736, 755–56 (2005); and then quoting W.H. Chaloner, The 
Hungry Forties, in INDUSTRY AND INNOVAITON: SELECTED ESSAYS—W.H. CHALONER 
232, 232–42 (D.A. Farnie & W.H. Henderson eds., 1990))).  
 66. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 6 (statement of Swift’s counsel). 
 67. Id. 
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Fessenden also discussed federal courts’ reputation among 
international investors, who had been crucial to the 1837 Panic.68 
According to Fessenden, the federal courts faced a basic choice: if 
Tyson were to prevail, then diversity cases involving New York 
transactions would deny payment applying New York law, while 
identical cases concerning non-New York transactions would grant 
payment under general common law. Such inconsistencies from one 
case to the next would ruin the Supreme Court’s international 
credibility: 
By all [outside] the United States, this Court is looked to as the 
judiciary of the whole nation,	.	.	.	whose commerce and 
transactions are as widely diffused as is the use of bills of 
exchange	.	.	.	.	How can this Court preserve its control over the 
reason and affections of the people of the United States	.	.	.	[if] 
it has decided	.	.	.	the same identical question, arising on a bill of 
exchange, first one way, and then the other, with vacillating 
inconsistency? In what light will the judicial character of the 
United States appear abroad, under such circumstances[?]69 
Fessenden argued that federal courts should instead decide all general 
common law cases by reference to “the actual consciences and 
judgments of the minds of the [federal] judges who constitute those 
Courts”—just as state common law cases were left “to the best 
judgment of the state Courts, without respect to the decision of any 
Court of the United States.”70 
Tyson’s contrary position was argued by Richard Henry Dana, 
who used the Rules of Decision Act to invoke broad theories about 
federal courts and the nature of common law.71 Dana framed Tyson’s 
argument by invoking the nation’s earliest legal history. After the 
American Revolution, every state had created a judicial system by 
statutorily receiving English common law and authorizing state-court 
modifications “to meet the exigencies of an enterprising people.”72 
 
 68. Rousseau, supra note 63, at 483 (“Disturbances from across the 
Atlantic	.	.	.	aggravated the monetary pressure	.	.	.	.	Most serious was a renewed series of 
commercial bill rejections in England	.	.	.	.”); see Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 8 (statement of 
Swift’s counsel) (“If there is any question of law	.	.	.	widely general in its nature and 
effects, it is the present question [i.e., the negotiability of bills of exchange]. It is one in 
which foreigners, the citizens of different states, in their contests with each other, nay, 
every nation of the civilized commercial world, are deeply interested.”). 
 69. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 8–9 (statement of Swift’s counsel). 
 70. Id. at 9. 
 71. Id. at 9–14 (statement of Tyson’s counsel). 
 72. Id. at 11. 
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But that emphatically did not happen for federal courts. There was 
never a federal statute adopting English common law, and Dana 
explained that Congress had created federal courts that were 
“anomalous in character [because they were] without rules of 
decision.”73 Relying on basic principles of federalism and separation 
of powers, Dana argued that no application of common law in federal 
courts could be legitimate in the absence of some prior constitutional 
or legislative authorization.74 
Dana claimed that the Rules of Decision Act had never licensed 
federal courts to apply English or “general” common law. Instead, the 
Act ordered federal courts to apply common law derived from “the 
several states,” thereby avoiding “perpetual confliction between the 
state and Federal Courts” in contexts where the two systems might 
disagree over particular common-law requirements.75 Dana explained 
that “[o]ur law idiom is essentially of common law origin, yet not 
foreign. It is the language familiar to us in the jurisprudence of the 
respective states.”76 Moreover, Dana argued that “[i]n coming 
together	.	.	.	,	the framers of the Constitution, and our representatives 
in [the first] Congress	.	.	.	had in view the language, laws, and 
institutions of the states which they represented.”77 According to 
Dana, Congress never adopted English common law, much less some 
kind of imaginary “uniform” common law.78 Instead, Congress had 
told federal courts to follow the common law as it existed in state 
courts and as previously authorized by state reception statutes.79 
Dana argued that the Rules of Decision Act “express[ed] all that 
was necessary for the adoption of the state laws.”80 But he further 
noted that 
[the Act] is all the provision there is upon the subject; and in so 
far as it falls short of the adoption of laws for the direction of 
the Courts, the defect is still unprovided for. The common law 
has never been otherwise adopted, nor have the Courts the 
 
 73. Id. at 10. 
 74. Id. at 11–12, 14. 
 75. Id. at 10–11 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 13. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 11. 
 80. Id. 
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power to create or adopt laws—they must administer the law as 
existing.81 
According to Dana, a requirement of statutory authorization for 
common-law decisionmaking reflected Congress’s foundational 
power to control federal courts, including federal judges’ obligation to 
apply law instead of inventing it. Without addressing Swift’s 
arguments about international commerce, Dana concluded that 
Tyson’s position was mandated by constitutional principle and also by 
statute.82 
Unfortunately for Tyson, the Court ignored Dana’s thesis about 
judicial lawmaking, instead concluding that the Rules of Decision 
Act’s term “laws” did not include general commercial law.83 On the 
other hand, the Court endorsed Fessenden’s economic thesis only in 
mild tones.84 And thus began interpretive debates about Swift’s 
original meaning that have lasted for 150 years. One interpreter might 
emphasize the Court’s result, which favored Fessenden and Swift and 
arguably implied a preference for commerce over legalism.85 A 
different interpreter, however, could focus on the opinion’s cautious 
language and the wide gap between the lawyers’ arguments and the 
Court’s explanation.86 Perhaps Swift was milquetoast after all—or 
maybe not. To further explore ambiguities about Swift’s original 
context requires examining the case from the deciding Justices’ 
perspective. 
b. Judges 
Much like lawyers’ courtroom arguments, judicial biographies 
offer a powerful source of implied precedential meaning. Few judges 
are studied as full human beings, but for those who are—legal 
celebrities like Marshall, Taney, Holmes, Cardozo, and Warren—
their lived experiences offer context for studying their judicial work.87 
Justice Story’s life is particularly significant for interpreting Swift 
because he did not accept the lawyers’ characterization of a pitched 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 14. 
 83. Id. at 18–19. 
 84. See id. at 20. 
 85. E.g., HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 250. 
 86. See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 336, 338. 
 87. E.g., JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996). 
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battle between law and economics.88 Instead, he saw a case where 
those concepts reinforced one another, under the management of 
erudite federal judges like himself.89 
Understanding Swift’s author begins with Story’s published 
Commentaries. In their day, these publications were unprecedented in 
scope and impact, and they remain among the most significant legal 
scholarship ever written in America.90 Distinctively important for 
 
 88. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 238–39 
(1909) (“Among the causes which led to the decision in Swift v. Tyson, the chief seems to 
have been the character and position of [Justice] Story.”). One might analyze all nine 
Justices who decided Swift, but an aggregate approach could distort reality just as 
grievously as an individual focus. There is often simply no way to identify who 
meaningfully created a collectively written work. 
 89. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 116–17 (“Behind Story’s opinions was a vision of 
economic man and a plan for economic progress. At the center of this American plan, 
shaping and guiding the process, were American common lawyers and judges.”). 
 90. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 247 (“[Story] was 
unquestionably ‘one of our greatest jurists and legal theorists.’ His numerous 
Commentaries	.	.	.	helped create a national legal system. His vast legal scholarship made 
him a ‘one-man West Publication Company.’	” (quoting NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 
282)); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated 
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1286 (1985) (“Alexander H. Stephens credited Story with 
virtually creating ex nihilo the nationalist constitutionalism that legitimized Abraham 
Lincoln’s successful war against secession	.	.	.	.	Professor Morton Horwitz has identified 
Story as a key actor in ‘the transformation of American law’ between 1780 and 1860, while 
Professor James McClellan has portrayed Story as, even more than John Marshall, the 
author of the political and constitutional system of the modern United States.” (footnotes 
omitted) (citing first 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE 
LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 505 (Phila., Nat’l Publ’g Co. 1868); then quoting 
HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 255–56; and then citing JAMES T. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH 
STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 305–09 (1971))); NEWMYER, supra note 33, 
at 193 (noting James Kent’s statement that Story’s scholarly “comprehensiveness” threw 
“all my little brief & narrow Sketches into the Shade”); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, 
supra note 30, at 123 (“[T]here is no question that Justice Story was the most learned and 
scholarly man ever to sit on the high bench.”); NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 184 (“By 
modern standards [Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution] look[] like a great beached 
whale; but in the nineteenth century it swam majestically in the raging seas of 
constitutional disputation.”); id. at 19 (describing Story as “the most prolific legal publicist 
in the nineteenth century”); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 144 (2d ed. 1926) (“[S]tory well earned the place of honor in American 
legal history to which he was assigned by the Bar; and his decisions will always be one of 
the great glories of the American Judiciary.”); ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE 
COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 2 (1992) (describing Story as 
“the prime architect of nineteenth-century American conflicts law”); Ernest G. Lorenzen, 
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. 
REV. 15, 38 (1934) (“In the United States and England, Story is revered today as the 
father of the conflict of laws. In this one hundredth anniversary year of the publication of 
his	Commentaries, the rest of the world joins the Anglo-American in rendering homage to 
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current purposes are Story’s commentaries on bills of exchange, his 
commentaries on conflicts of laws, and his commentaries on the 
Constitution.91 
i.  Commercial Law 
Story’s commentaries on bills of exchange assembled cases from 
both sides of the Atlantic.92 Story synthesized cases around shared 
practicalities and principles, thus presenting commercial law as a 
unified, singular object to be evaluated for its coherence and 
pragmatism.93 His vision of transatlantic unity matched the economic 
function of negotiable paper. Shared legal principles allowed credit to 
move across borders, with goods and services following close 
behind.94 In the mid-nineteenth century, enforceable commercial 
instruments allowed people who were divided by national boundaries 
to nonetheless rely on each other for credit and payment, and such 
transnational business activities were indispensable on both sides of 
the Atlantic.95 
 
the great American jurist, and to acclaim him one of the leading personalities of all time in 
the field of the conflict of laws.”). 
 91. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF 
EXCHANGE (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1860) (1843) [hereinafter STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE]; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834) [hereinafter STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS]; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) [hereinafter 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
 92. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 246 (“Onto the body of the common law [Story] 
graft[ed] the ‘enlightened and liberal rules’ of commercial law, which he drew from every 
age and all nations.”). 
 93. Id. at 285 (“Bringing rational order out of apparent chaos was, as Story saw 
it	.	.	.	the distinguishing mark of Mansfield’s commercial law	.	.	.	and in this tradition Story 
made the search for organizing principle the essence of his legal science.”); cf. Ellen 
Holmes Pearson, Revising Custom, Embracing Choice: Early American Legal Scholars & 
The Republicanization of the Common Law, in EMPIRE AND NATION: THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 93, 95 (Eliga H. Gould & Peter S. Onuf eds., 
2005) (discussing Mansfield’s efforts to tame the “confusing, unwieldy system” of English 
common law through the “creation of a commercial law code” of systematic judicial 
precedents). 
 94. See Henretta, supra note 62, at 302. 
 95. Id. at 302; J. Sperling, The International Payments Mechanism in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, 14 ECON. HIST. REV. 446, 446 (1962) (quoting financier Nathan 
Rothschild’s opinion that England was “the Bank for the whole world	.	.	.	[as] all 
transactions in India, in China, in Germany, in the whole world are guided here and 
settled through this country”); see also FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 3 (“Between 
1815 and 1860 the value of the [United States’s] foreign trade grew from $166 to $762 
million.	.	.	.	In 1810, 93 million pounds of cotton were exported, and, after [1815], the 
volume increased steadily	.	.	.	[to] more than one billion pounds annually in the late 
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Story saw uniform commercial law as a precondition for the 
international mercantile economy that had dominated American life, 
and he sought—as a commentator and also a judge—to describe and 
prescribe standards that would regulate bills of exchange effectively 
across borders.96 Story was always certain that his analysis of 
commercial practice and legal doctrine was correct, which explains his 
faith that Swift’s reasoning would ultimately persuade lawyers or state 
judges who might otherwise disagree.97 
ii.  Conflicts of Law 
Story’s commentaries on conflicts of law reveal a different side of 
Swift. The entire topic “conflicts of law” presupposes variation among 
the laws of different nations and states.98 Even as Story synthesized 
the substantive law governing bills of exchange, he had no delusions 
about a preordained or unified commercial law in the Anglo-
American world.99 More than anyone, Story understood the 
multilayered and polycentric structure of nineteenth-century common 
law, and that experience was certainly important in Swift.100 Story’s 
 
1850s.” (footnote omitted) (citing first Joseph J. Klein, The Development of Mercantile 
Instruments of Credit in the United States, 12 J. ACCT. 321, 321–45 (1911); then citing 
Nathan Isaacs, Business Postulates and the Law, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1014–30 (1928))); 
id. at 4 (“[L]ong-distance credit transactions were made through the medium of special 
commercial contracts, particularly bills of exchange and promissory notes.”); id. at 24 
(“The inconveniences arising from [state-law] diversities would seem	.	.	.	not only to 
trouble the lawyer and the court, but to render the commercial and trading part of the 
community liable to perpetual mistakes, losses, and vexations.” (quoting Book Review, 
The American Jurist, 29 N. AM. REV. 418, 422 (1829) (reviewing Joseph Story, An Address 
Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, on the Fourth of 
September, 1821, 1 AM. JURIST 1 (1829)))). 
 96. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 79–80; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 120, 
281–82. 
 97. See FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 18. 
 98. See WATSON, supra note 90, at 1. 
 99. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 289 (“Story came to understand	.	.	.	the 
centrifugal disruption of uniformity caused by federalism and the unevenness of doctrinal 
transplantation.”); id. at 305–06 (“[Story] knew from practice that	.	.	.	.	[t]he commercial 
wants to which these groups adjusted law were not abstract verities written in the clouds 
but instead the practical calculations of businessmen who needed law to help them 
mobilize resources, expand markets, and maximize profits.”); Pearson, supra note 93, at 94 
(“[L]ocal versions of common law continued to evolve as each state built its own form of 
republican government and redefined the common law system to fit new republican 
parameters.”). 
 100. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 288 (“Commercial common law was not, [for Story], 
a vague, mystical creation, a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky,’ as Holmes would later 
put it. The comparative and historical techniques, as Story applied them, were demanding 
and rigorous, and the ‘universal reasoning’ they ascertained was based	.	.	.	more on what 
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commentaries explained that courts had applied conflicts doctrine for 
centuries, with the overriding goal of creating an interjurisdictional 
system that could manage frictions and complexity.101 
Story saw that, taken as a conflicts case, Swift had no perfect 
answer. If the Court were to grant payment on the bill of exchange, 
that would create disparities and “confliction[s]” between federal 
courts and state courts in cases about New York transactions.102 Yet 
to deny payment would differentiate federal cases about New York 
transactions from federal cases about non-New York transactions.103 
Conflicts of law jurisprudence was designed to address exactly these 
kinds of difficulties, and so was Swift. With respect to 
transjurisdictional mechanisms like bills of exchange, Story wrote that 
the Supreme Court—like state courts—should apply the transnational 
law of merchants.104 According to Justice Story, capital should flow 
freely across borders, aided by interterritorial legal doctrines, and no 
state court could claim authoritative superiority in applying such 
aspirationally uniform and enduring principles.105 In this respect, 
Story was not only confident in his substantive analysis regarding bills 
of exchange; he also thought that Swift’s approach to conflicts of law 
could manage any period of interjurisdictional difference.106 
iii.  Constitutional Law 
Story’s commentaries on the Constitution place Swift in an 
appropriately political context.107 Story dedicated these commentaries 
 
was than on what should be.” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
 101. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS, supra note 91, at 8. See generally 
WATSON, supra note 90, at 2. 
 102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 104. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 646 (1938). 
 105. Id. at 19. 
 106. See id. (“Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are 
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but 
they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments 
are to be bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly 
declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 
883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the 
commercial world.”). 
 107. Story’s Harvard professorship highlights the politics of legal education and 
scholarship. As the Federalist Party lost national elections to Jeffersonian Democrats, its 
first response was to add new federal judges who could maintain order until the next 
election. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 
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to John Marshall, and they defended the same broad national powers 
that the Chief Justice had upheld throughout his judicial career.108 In 
the Jacksonian era that Story occupied, such nationalist views were 
controversial, and the response to his work was correspondingly 
mixed.109 
Even as Story urged all judges—federal, state, and English—to 
support transatlantic commerce, his constitutional commentaries 
assigned federal courts a privileged position.110 Federal judges were 
constitutional architects on topics like federalism and separation of 
powers, and Story practiced what he preached. Story wrote the 
majority opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, which proclaimed the 
need for uniform federal law and declared the Supreme Court as its 
mouthpiece.111 He also authored the Court’s decision in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, which enforced federal fugitive slave statutes despite 
state liberty laws that were significantly more protective.112 
In Swift, Story read the Rules of Decision Act much like vague 
constitutional provisions that left important unresolved issues for the 
 
Cranch) 299 (1803). When Democrats kept winning, however, Federalists relied on 
Harvard to manufacture conservative lawyers and legal culture to counter Jeffersonian 
excess. See R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the 
Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, 74 J. AM. HIST. 814, 817–19 (1987). In this 
regard, everything about Story’s scholarly work was deeply political in nature. NEWMYER, 
supra note 33, at 217 (“The duty of ‘public men’ was to resist [Jacksonian political abuse], 
and in the lead had to be the ‘professional intelligence’ of the country. At the head of this 
intelligentsia, one assumes, were certain Justices of the Supreme Court.” (quoting Letter 
from Justice Story to Richard Peters (Apr. 24, 1833), in	2	LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH 
STORY 140, 141 (William W. Story ed., New World Book Mfg. Co. 1971) (1851))). 
 108. 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at iii. 
 109. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 219; Powell, supra note 90, at 1285–86. 
 110. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 18 (“Story	.	.	.	suggested	.	.	.	that a prime 
‘tendency’ of federal jurisdiction was ‘to increase the confidence and credit between the 
commercial and agricultural states. No man can be insensible to the value, in promoting 
credit, of	.	.	.	prompt, efficient, and impartial administration of justice in enforcing 
contracts.’	” (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, 
at 564)); NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 121 (“To strengthen the federal courts and 
regularize the process of adjudication	.	.	.	was to enhance the potential for the kind of law 
American business needed; it was to accelerate the ‘tendency’ toward the goal of a 
national system of contract and credit	.	.	.	.” (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 564)); cf. JOSEPH STORY, JOSEPH STORY AND THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 106 (Valerie L. Horowitz ed., Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2006) 
(1844) (“[N]o legislature can make a system half so just, or perfect, or harmonious, both 
from want of time, and experience, and opportunity of knowledge, as judges, who are 
successively called to administer justice, and gather light from the wisdom of their 
predecessors.”). 
 111. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344, 347–48 (1816). 
 112. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842). 
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Court to decide. Under all circumstances, Story had deep faith in the 
Supreme Court’s ability to interpret vague language in a way that 
would implement constitutional values. In deciding Swift, as 
elsewhere, Story did not perceive a real tension between law and 
democratic politics. Congress had enacted the Rules of Decision Act 
with apparently sensible intentions, but it was the Court’s duty to 
interpret and apply the legislature’s unspecified term “laws of the 
several states,” just as the Court interpreted unclear constitutional 
terms in other kinds of cases.113 
Justice Story’s biography reflects a celebratory view of federal 
courts’ leadership, and Swift definitely fits the pattern. Topics like 
“general commercial law” were key to America’s economic and 
national success, and Story and Swift envisioned common lawmaking 
as an elite, professional, transnational discourse based on enduring 
principles and adaptive practicality.114 In the United States, federal 
courts were major agents of both stasis and change, and in that 
political context, the triumph of Swift over Tyson was one more 
victory for Marshallian nationalism over states-rights restrictions.115 
Story might even have thought that the genius of general common 
law, wielded by conservative visionaries like himself, could strengthen 
commercial bonds and buffer the partisan sectional divisions that 
would eventually prompt national war in the 1860s.116 Law, 
economics, and constitutional politics were bound together in this one 
 
 113. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
 114. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 41, 79; FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 
30, at 33; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 281 (“[Story’s] constant premise	.	.	.	was his long-
held distrust of legislative competence and a preference for law made by judges.”); 
Henretta, supra note 62, at 301–03. 
 115. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 197–98 (describing “the classic dilemma of 
adjudication” as “the need to adjust old law to new history while preserving the semblance 
of legal continuity on which judicial authority must rest”); Pearson, supra note 93, at 98 
(noting that some nineteenth-century American jurists, such as Philadelphia lawyer and 
law lecturer Peter DuPonceau, viewed the common law as “America’s ‘national law,’	” 
which “had gradually ‘become incorporated and in a manner identified not only with the 
national jurisprudence, but, under the name of Constitution,’ with America’s government” 
(citations omitted)); id. at 106 (noting objections by state-sovereignty Republicans that “it 
would be ‘altogether a hopeless attempt, to endeavor to extract from such discordant 
materials, [a] uniform system of national jurisprudence’	” (citations omitted)). 
 116. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 290 (“Commercial operations, as Story noted in his 
Commentaries on the Constitution, depended on political unity, on constitutional union; 
ties of union, on the other hand, would be strengthened by uniform private commercial 
law, which would enhance business relationships between citizens of different states, thus 
circumventing and finally diminishing state and regional particularism.”). 
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man’s life, and from a biographical viewpoint, they can also be seen in 
the Swift opinion that Story was perfectly suited to write. 
c. Contemporary Reactions 
Three interpretations of Swift should now be visible: ‘‘nothing-
to-see” textualism, ‘‘law-versus-economics” lawyering, and “trust-the-
judges” biography. But there is another category of originalist context 
to consider. Reception history, as it is called, allows interpreters to 
discern a case’s “understood meaning” based on contemporary 
reactions of lawyers, judges, and commentators. Such reception 
history is rare in legal discourse and scholarship, though it sometimes 
appears in variants of constitutional interpretation.117 
Even the most careful legal historians have overlooked 
immediate reactions to the Swift decision,118 and that silence has been 
read to mean that either: (a) Swift was an unremarkable application 
of longstanding principles,119 or (b) the Court’s pro-commercial 
aggression had become a dominant and accepted ideological 
system.120 
All of those judgments are incorrect. Within a month of the 
Court’s decision, at least twelve newspapers—from New Orleans to 
New Hampshire, from Ohio to New York City—printed descriptions 
of Swift as an “Important Decision.”121 Each of these sources 
 
 117. One basis for resisting reception history is a form of ultra-legalism that posits the 
meaning of legal sources as independent of social and cultural facts, such that cases like 
Swift “are what they are,” regardless of what observers thought at the time. Cultural 
scholars have debunked comparable symbolic naturalization in other historical contexts. 
E.g., Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 3–30 (1973). 
 118. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 334 (“The [Swift] decision was barely noticed by 
contemporary newspapers and periodicals	.	.	.	.”); see FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, 
at 17–18; FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 89, 152; see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, 
supra note 30, at 69; HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 245–52 (ignoring Swift’s contemporary 
reception); PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 60–61; 2 WARREN, supra note 90, at 
89; cf. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 33–34 (citing only judicial decisions that applied or 
endorsed the doctrine). 
 119. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 170; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 336. 
 120. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 53; HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 249–50. 
 121. Important Decision, PUB. LEDGER (Phila.), Jan. 28, 1842, at 2; Important 
Decision, THE SUN (Balt.), Jan. 28, 1842, at 2; Important Decision, OHIO STATESMAN 
(Columbus), Feb. 8, 1842, at 1; Important Decision, DEMOCRATIC STANDARD 
(Georgetown, Ohio), Feb. 15, 1842, at 3; Important Decision, N.H. PATRIOT & ST. 
GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 1842, at 1; Important Decision, S. PIONEER & CARROLL, CHOCTAW & 
TALLAHATCHIE COUNTIES ADVERTISER (Carrollton, Miss.), Apr. 23, 1842, at 1; 
Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 29, 1842, 
at 1; Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, N. AM. & DAILY 
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proclaimed, in nearly identical terms: “The Supreme Court of the 
United States has pronounced an opinion settling an important 
commercial question, which ought to be soon and generally 
known.”122 While emphasizing Swift as a ruling about bills of 
exchange, newspapers also mentioned the Court’s holding that the 
Rules of Decision Act “only extends to the statutes and permanent 
usages of a State, and not to the judicial decisions of the States upon 
questions of general commercial law.”123 
Such contemporary reactions offer a striking contrast from 
modern legal interpretations of Swift. Early reports did not link Swift 
with mid-nineteenth-century fights over constitutional federalism and 
nationalism.124 Nor did contemporaries view Swift as a judicial 
usurpation that violated separation of powers.125 Despite the litigants’ 
ambitious arguments about constitutional structure, no early news 
report analyzed Swift in that light, nor was the case an occasion for 
partisan struggle. 
Commentary on Swift from the nineteenth-century legal 
profession was also ostensibly apolitical, as the country’s most 
prominent legal writers formed a tight circle of mutual admiration. 
Just as Story’s Swift opinion had cited James Kent’s work as legal 
support, Kent praised the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift, and 
Story-as-publicist expressed admiration for his own product on the 
bench.126 A powerful consensus of academic and lawyerly 
 
ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 1, 1842, at 2; Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, S. ARGUS (Columbus, Miss.), Feb. 15, 1842, at 2; Important Decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, CONN. COURANT, Feb. 12, 1842, at 3; Supreme Court 
Decision, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 9, 1842, at 4; Supreme Court 
Decision, NEW ORLEANS WKLY. PICAYUNE, Feb. 14, 1842, at 3. Legal periodicals were 
scant at the time, yet at least three mentioned Swift for its commercial holding. See Bills of 
Exchange, 1 PA. L.J. 219 (1842); District Court of the United States, for the Western District 
of Virginia, Prentice v. Lane., 6 W.L.J. 46 (1848) (discussing Swift several years after the 
fact); Selections from McLean’s Reports, 1 W.L.J. 134, 135 (1843) (noting the “striking 
illustration of the inconclusiveness of precedents”); see also 2 WARREN, supra note 90, at 
88–89 (referencing additional historical newspaper sources). 
 122. See sources cited supra note 121. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Story was publicly decried in other contexts as improperly boosting central 
governmental authority, yet Swift was consistently absent from such indictments. E.g., 
Speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, in U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV., Jan. 1839, at 230; Life 
of Joseph Story, by His Son, EVENING POST (N.Y.C.), Jan. 29, 1852, at 2 (pt. 1), Feb. 4, 
1852, at 2 (pt. 2) (reviewing LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY (William W. Story ed., 
1851)). 
 125. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 121. 
 126. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 46; STORY, COMMENTARIES ON BILLS OF 
EXCHANGE, supra note 91, at 191–92, 204–10 & n.4. 
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commentary endorsed Swift for almost forty years, with literally no 
dissent,127 as the decision was interpreted as a leading case of 
commercial law and federal jurisprudence. 
Despite these endorsements, however, Swift did not produce 
national doctrinal uniformity with respect to commercial paper. In 
Stalker v. M’Donald,128 New York’s high court rejected Swift’s 
treatment of bills of exchange, thereby creating a “confliction” 
between federal and state courts that would endure for five 
decades.129 Chancellor Walworth criticized Swift’s interpretation of 
cases from New York and elsewhere, as he also disparaged Swift for 
issuing dicta on facts that were not before the Court.130 To understand 
Stalker’s critique, however, modern readers must note that Walworth 
wholeheartedly accepted Swift’s interpretation of the Rules of 
Decision Act and the Supreme Court’s relationship to general 
commercial law: 
[I]n questions of local law,	.	.	.	the decisions of the highest court 
of judicature of the state are the evidence of what the law of the 
state is; and are to be followed in preference to those	.	.	.	even of 
the United States. On a question of commercial law, however, it 
is desirable that there should be	.	.	.	uniformity of decision, not 
only between the courts of the several states and of the United 
States, but also between our courts and those of England, from 
whence our commercial law is principally derived, and with 
which country our commercial intercourse is so extensive.131 
According to Walworth, Swift’s mistake did not involve the 
nature of general commercial law, separation of powers, federal 
overreaching, or the state sovereignty of New York to establish its 
own rules concerning bills of exchange. Walworth simply believed 
that Story and his peers had misread applicable commercial law 
precedents, and he asserted New York’s legal authority only by 
declining to follow the Supreme Court’s mistake. Walworth held that 
 
 127. The first categorical attack on Swift’s federal general common law was Robert G. 
Street, Is There a General Commercial Law of the United States, 21 AM. L. REG. 473 
(1873); see infra text accompanying note 166. 
 128. 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843). 
 129. Id. at 95; W.M. Crook, Uniform State Laws: An Economic Legal Development 
Resulting from the Relation of the State to Federal Government, 4 TEX. L. REV. 316, 319 
(1926). 
 130. Stalker, 6 Hill at 95, 104. Walworth issued his own dictum in Stalker, which New 
York courts adopted and applied in other cases. See, e.g., Farrington v. Frankfort Bank, 24 
Barb. 554, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857). 
 131. Stalker, 6 Hill at 95. 
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the New York rule, not Swift, was the accurate reflection of general 
common law as it was adopted from England and applied in other 
state courts; he also took special pains to emphasize New York’s 
unwavering doctrinal stability in enforcing bills of exchange according 
to proper legal principles.132 
The fact that the state courts of New York rejected Story’s view 
of doctrine and finance is immensely important, but it has never been 
adequately discussed.133 By 1842, New York was America’s greatest 
city, with vastly more international trade than anywhere else in the 
country.134 New York judges therefore had deep experience with the 
law and practice of interjurisdictional commerce. If Story was so 
obviously right about the economic stakes in Swift or Stalker, how 
could New York courts retain a contrary and self-destructive rule for 
many decades, with frequent opportunities to change course?135 
Justice Story had written that Swift’s approach to bills of exchange 
was indispensable to American banking and credit. And although 
academics and some state courts agreed, the legal center of American 
finance unapologetically did not.136 
It is not clear why New York rejected the doctrine that Swift and 
its admirers so warmly endorsed. Yet it is evident that the dispute did 
not turn on federalism, separation of powers, judicial role, 
doctrinalism, popular democracy, pro-commercial interest, or any 
other extant scholarly explanation. One important possibility, 
suggested in Walworth’s opinion itself, concerns New York’s 
reputation for doctrinal stability as the preeminent commercial court 
 
 132. Id. at 111–12. 
 133. America’s second financial center, Philadelphia, also followed New York’s rule. 
See, e.g., Pratt’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 378, 382 (1875); Trotter v. Shippen, 2 Pa. 358, 358 (1845). 
 134. Rousseau, supra note 63, at 462–63 (noting that New York banks held a reserve 
base “more than ten times that of New Orleans, and	.	.	.	nearly triple the combined specie 
reserves of deposit banks in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee”); 
see SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 17–18 (2001) (“By 
1860,	.	.	.	[New York’s] chief rivals, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore	.	.	.	traded in 
goods only one-quarter the value of those which passed through the port of New York.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Grocers’ Bank v. Penfield, 69 N.Y. 502 (1877). 
 136. Twelve states (California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas) followed 
Swift’s commercial-law doctrine, whereas thirteen states (Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) did not. Arthur Biddle, In re Huddle & Seitzinger, 14 AM. 
L. REV. 503, 506–13 (1880). 
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in America.137 Perhaps the battle between Swift and Stalker turned on 
the axiom that New York courts would take orders from no one on 
issues of commercial law, yielding to neither federal courts nor self-
confident publicists. Stalker’s outcome may thus have been influenced 
by a regional competition between Chancellor Walworth’s Gotham 
and Justice Story’s Washington, D.C. In both cities, self-confident 
judges claimed to represent the best transnational thinking about 
commercial law, and they sought to wield correspondingly decisive 
power over the nation’s economic future through their judicial 
decisions. In this sense, nineteenth-century jurists may thus have 
understood the conflict of Stalker versus Swift as a now-forgotten 
choice between a commercial empire led by New York’s state courts 
and one directed by national federal judges like Story.138 
Nearly all modern commentators have ignored the reaction of 
America’s great commercial center, thereby lending Swift’s economic 
analysis a patina of inevitability—just as Story and national elites 
would have preferred. New York’s persistent doctrinal conflict, 
however, shows that Story’s educated analysis did not tell (and could 
not know) the whole truth about American law and American 
commerce. Pro-Swift judges and national-elite commentators 
described only one plausible vision of commercial credit and bills of 
exchange. The proliferation of that vision in the decades to follow 
resulted from complicated political, cultural, and regional dynamics; it 
did not derive from objectively neutral economic truth or financial 
efficiency. 
3.  Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning 
This Part has thus far focused on originalist nineteenth-century 
materials from the time Swift was decided. As is true with statutes and 
constitutions, however, precedents’ original meanings do not stand 
pat.139 Over nine decades, Swift came to represent far more than 
commercial credit and pluralism. As Grant Gilmore wrote, “Swift v. 
Tyson became a headless monster, marked down for destruction by 
 
 137. Stalker, 6 Hill at 111–12. Modern readers might compare Delaware’s current 
status as a nerve center of American corporate law. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003). 
 138. Cf. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 34 (suggesting that the Swift decision is what 
made “the Supreme Court of the United States	.	.	.	a great commercial law court. 
[Thereafter, as] novel issues generated controversy and conflict, the Court’s function was 
to propose a generally acceptable synthesis”). 
 139. Cf. BALKIN, supra note 3; ESKRIDGE, supra note 2. 
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all right-thinking men.”140 This subsection demonstrates that Swift’s 
path to the heretical stake was astonishingly slow, episodic, and 
political. To understand Swift’s development will require consulting 
judicial opinions, academic commentary, and democratic politics from 
the late-nineteenth century; yet those labors will ultimately produce 
fresh interpretations of Swift’s successor, Erie v. Tompkins.141 
Even when Swift was decided, its result governed more than 
negotiable instruments, and the Supreme Court issued many rulings 
over twenty years that applied, expanded, and debated the proper 
scope of federal general common law.142 Throughout this period, 
however, judicial dissents were rare and mild, and no judge or 
commentator criticized the category of Swift-era common law as 
unwise or illegitimate.143 
Between 1860 and 1910, only two judicial opinions questioned 
Swift; both of these were dissents, and neither one had much doctrinal 
impact on other cases. The first dissent arose from Gelpcke v. City of 
Dubuque, a case about municipal bonds that had been issued to 
support railroad construction.144 When the Panic of 1837 destroyed 
the city’s tax base, Dubuque refused to make payments, claiming that 
the state statute authorizing the bonds violated the state 
constitution.145 Iowa’s highest court had rejected similar arguments 
many times before, but it reversed course in 1862 and invalidated 
municipal bonds that were identical to Dubuque’s.146 
Gelpcke’s plaintiffs tried to avoid Iowa’s newly dangerous 
precedent by filing their suit against Dubuque in federal district court; 
on appeal, the United States Supreme Court voted eight to one that 
Dubuque should pay its bonds.147 The Court did not reinterpret Iowa 
 
 140. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 61. 
 141. See infra Section I.B. 
 142. E.g., Carpenter v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 495, 496 (1842) 
(applying Swift’s federal general common law to insurance contracts). 
 143. E.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1885) (applying federal general 
common law to equitable remedies against corporate directors); Williamson v. Berry, 49 
U.S. (8 How.) 495 (1850) (private statutes in an ejectment case); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847) (contract law concerning slavery). 
 144. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 202–03 (1864); see also 
MICHAEL ANTHONY ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN 
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 89–90 (2003). 
 145. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 203–04. 
 146. Id. at 205; ROSS, supra note 144, at 89. 
 147. Stephen Field became the tenth Justice only months before Gelpcke was decided, 
and December 1863 was the only term in which all ten Justices would sit together. As it 
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state law—that would have been impossible given authoritative 
judgments from the state’s own high court. Instead, Gelpcke 
protected bondholders using federal general common law. “It cannot 
be expected that this court will follow every [state court] oscillation, 
from whatever [political] cause arising	.	.	.	.	[Iowa’s] earlier decisions, 
we think, are sustained by reason and authority. They are in harmony 
with the adjudications of sixteen States of the Union.”148 And the 
majority opinion closed with a swagger: “However we may regard the 
late case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have no effect upon the 
past.	.	.	.	We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a 
State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”149 
Whatever Iowa’s courts might do with bondholder cases on their own 
dockets, Gelpcke made clear that litigants in federal courts would 
receive general common law principles only and exactly as federal 
judges saw fit to apply them. 
Gelpcke’s lone dissenter, Justice Miller, was an Iowa resident 
who had recused himself from similar bond cases involving his 
hometown.150 Miller predicted that Iowa’s state courts would never be 
convinced by the majority’s reasoning.151 “Thus we are to have two 
courts, sitting within the same jurisdiction, deciding upon the same 
rights, arising out of the same statute, yet always arriving at opposite 
results, with no common arbiter of their differences.”152 He 
declaimed, “[w]hat this may lead to it is not possible now to 
foresee.”153 
The risk of “confliction” between state and federal courts had 
been inherent and foreseeable ever since Swift, with Stalker as 
immediate proof.154 Nonetheless, in other cases outside the context of 
municipal bonds, the entire Court—including Justice Miller—
continued to apply general commercial law with no reservations 
whatsoever.155 
 
happens, however, Chief Justice Taney did not participate in Gelpcke because of illness. 
See 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 430 (2012). 
 148. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 205–06. 
 149. Id. at 206–07. 
 150. Lee Cty. v. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 181 (1868). 
 151. ROSS, supra note 144, at 89–92, 169–75, 222, 224. 
 152. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 209 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Compare case cited supra note 75 and accompanying text (anticipating such 
“confliction”), with sources cited supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (discussing 
Stalker). 
 155. See Yates v. City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 506 (1870) (Miller, J.) 
(applying “general common law” that did “not depend upon State statute or local State 
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In the particular circumstance of Iowa’s bond crisis, Miller’s fears 
were confirmed when thousands of citizens rallied to protest being 
“persistently pursued in the federal courts by certain holders 
of	.	.	.	railroad bonds.”156 One politician ranted: “You freed the 
negro	.	.	.	and fastened eternal white slavery upon yourselves and [your] 
children by lowering and knuckling to	.	.	.	the monied monopolies of 
the country.”157 Gelpcke’s bank was sacked, and Otto Gelpcke fled to a 
jailhouse as a mob besieged his home.158 When Miller dissented in a 
later bondholder case, he offered his own personal report of Gelpcke’s 
consequences: 
These frequent dissents	.	.	.	are as distasteful to me as they can 
be to any one else. But when I am compelled, as I was last 
spring, by the decisions of this court,	.	.	.	to jail	.	.	.	over a 
hundred of the best citizens of Iowa, for obeying, as they 
thought their oath of office required them to do, an injunction 
issued by a competent court of their own State,	.	.	.	I must be 
excused if, when sitting here, I give expression to convictions 
which my duty compels me to disregard in the Circuit Court.159 
By century’s end, the Court had heard roughly 300 bond cases, as 
identical issues arose in nearly every state.160 Pennsylvania’s Chief 
Justice Black wrote that enforcing railroad bonds was “beyond all 
comparison, the most important cause that has ever been in this court 
since the formation of the government.”161 And Iowa’s state courts 
bemoaned that “counties and cities throughout the State	.	.	.	incurred 
debts amounting to several millions of dollars,	.	.	.	exceeding their 
ability to pay. Disaster, the child of extravagance and debt, and 
 
law,” and declaring that “this court has never acknowledged the right of the State courts to 
control our decisions, except, perhaps, in a class of cases where the State courts have 
established, by repeated decisions, a rule of property in regard to land titles peculiar to the 
State”); see also Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883) (similar). 
 156. ROSS, supra note 144, at 169–70. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Winslow’s Career in Dubuque: How He Became General Manager of a Bank—
And What Became of the Bank, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Jan. 16, 1877, at 6; Duties of 
Trustees in Compromising Debts, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1875, at 2; The Dubuque County 
Railroad Indebtedness—The Gelpcke Claim Settled, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, May 
6, 1864, at 1. The city of Dubuque reportedly had only 40,000 inhabitants and $1.5 million 
in debt. The Dubuque County Railroad Indebtedness—The Gelpcke Claim Settled, supra, 
at 1. 
 159. Butz v. City of Muscatine, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 575, 587 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting). 
 160. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 60. 
 161. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 158 (1853) (Black, C.J.). 
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dishonor, the unbidden companion of bankruptcy, are the bitter but 
legitimate consequences of that decision, ‘and the end is not yet.’	”162 
Although Swift’s general common law had never entered such 
political minefields, the public silence that accompanied Gelpcke—
outside of Iowa—is impressive.163 Only one sentence can be found in 
newspapers announcing the decision,164 and despite heated fights over 
comparable state decisions, no commentary in the next decade (again 
excepting Iowa) criticized federal courts’ “general common law” as a 
category.165 Political battles over municipal debt never focused their 
attacks on federal general common law itself until 1873, after an 
entirely separate financial panic.166 In this much later period, it was 
Justice Miller’s opposition to railroad bonds—not concerns about 
federal general common law—that almost carried him to two 
presidential nominations.167 
The second judicial dissent that criticized Swift in the nineteenth 
century arose from cases involving industrial accidents. Injuries from 
trolleys, industry, and railroads were more prevalent in Guilded-Era 
America than anywhere in the world, and such accidents affected many 
aspects of public life.168 In 1862, the Supreme Court applied federal 
 
 162. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 33 (1869). The Iowa court did not identify the 
reference for its quotation, but the most likely source is the Bible. Matthew 24:6 (King 
James). 
 163. The Supreme Court’s early bond cases were Butz, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 575 (7–2 
decision); Lee County v. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 181 (1868) (8–0 decision); Gelpcke v. 
City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863) (8–1 decision). Also notable were Olcott v. 
Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872); Chicago v. Sheldon, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 50 (1869); 
Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1865); Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U.S. 
(3 Wall.) 327 (1865). 
 164. Supreme Court of the United States, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Jan. 
12, 1864, at 3 (“Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the Court, reversing the 
judgment of the said District Court, with costs, and remanding the cause for further 
proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this Court.”). Because 
Gelpcke consisted of three consolidated cases, the Intelligencer printed that same sentence 
three times. 
 165. Compare Summary of Events, 5 AM. L. REV. 126, 156–58 (1870) (endorsing 
Gelpcke), with Iowa Reports, 1 W. JURIST 216, 218–23 (1867) (opposing Gelpcke in a 
publication from Des Moines). 
 166. Street, supra note 127, at 473; see Nicolas Barreyre, The Politics of Economic 
Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and the Realignment of American 
Politics, 10 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 403, 403 (2011) (describing the financial 
panic following Reconstruction.). 
 167. ROSS, supra note 144, at 237–38. 
 168. See PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 19; 2 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & 
DAVID EMORY SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 590 (9th ed. 2012); BARBARA 
WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD 
REVOLUTION, 1865–1920, at 3–4 (2001). 
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general common law to resolve Chicago City v. Robbins, which 
concerned a pedestrian who was injured beside a construction site.169 
Illinois law would have excused the owner for his contractor’s negligent 
excavations, yet the Supreme Court unanimously imposed liability 
under federal general common law:170 “[W]here private rights are to be 
determined by the application of common law rules alone, this 
Court	.	.	.	does not feel bound by [state] decisions.”171 
General “common law rules alone” were similarly decisive in 
1884, when Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ross 
decided whether employees could sue employers for a coworker’s 
negligence.172 (This was the nationally significant “fellow-servant 
rule.”173) The Court unanimously agreed that general common law 
should decide the issue, but they split 5–4 on the merits.174 Justice 
Stephen Field’s majority opinion allowed the plaintiff to recover, citing 
as support a nationally prominent treatise and case law from several 
different states.175 Justice Joseph Bradley wrote a one-paragraph 
dissent that fully endorsed the application of federal general common 
law, but he argued that the “long-established” rule of fellow-servant 
immunity meant the defendant should win on the merits.176 
For yet another decade, the Court’s fights about the content of 
general common law unanimously presumed such law’s existence and 
validity. In 1893, however, every member of the Ross majority had 
retired except Field.177 In that year, the majority opinion in Baltimore 
 
 169. Chi. City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 418–20 (1862), aff’d, 71 U.S (4 Wall.) 
657 (1866).  
 170. Freyer has written that Miller and Justice Samuel Nelson dissented from this 
decision without opinion, but those dissents are not recorded in the United States Reports. 
Compare FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 65, with Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 
418–29. The Robbins Court’s holding was unanimously affirmed in a subsequent appeal 
concerning the same facts, raising further questions about whether Miller and Nelson had 
dissented earlier. See Robbins v. Chi. City, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1866). 
 171. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 428–29 (maintaining an exception to this rule for 
federal courts to apply state law “[w]here rules of property in a State are fully settled”). 
 172. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 112 U.S. 377, 377–78 (1884). 
 173. The “fellow-servant rule” was an exception to the principle that defendant-
employers should be liable for their agents’ negligence, and it denied recovery to plaintiff-
employees for countless workplace injuries and deaths. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack 
Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 51–
54 (1967). 
 174. Ross, 112 U.S. at 377. 
 175. Id. at 390–91; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 52 (2003). 
 176. Ross, 112 U.S. at 396 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 177. Cf. Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 390 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting); 
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893) (Field, J., abstaining). 
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& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh held—fully consistent with Robbins, 
Ross, and other Swift-era cases—that tort rules such as fellow-servant 
immunity did not pose any “question of local law, to be settled by an 
examination merely of the decisions of [Ohio]	.	.	.	, but rather one of 
general law, to be determined by a reference to all the authorities, and 
a consideration of the principles underlying the relations of master and 
servant.”178 Despite the Court’s unbroken adherence to prior cases 
concerning the applicability of federal general common law, Baugh 
overruled the substantive result in Ross, reinterpreting general common 
law to hold that the defendant-employer was not liable for a fellow-
servant’s negligence.179 
One might have easily predicted that Justice Field would dissent 
from Baugh’s judgment that his own opinion in Ross was incorrect. But 
no one could have foreseen Field’s unprecedented claim in Baugh that 
“the settled law of Ohio	.	.	.	should control.”180 Ignoring fifty years of 
federal cases and acres of tort law, Field wrote that master-servant 
relations “are matters of legislative control, and are in no sense under 
the supervision or direction of the judges or courts of the United 
States.”181 Field continued: “There is no unwritten general or common 
law of the United States on the subject. Indeed, there is no unwritten 
general or common law of the United States on any subject.”182 This 
latter statement contradicted numerous judicial authorities, including 
Field’s opinion in Ross itself.183 
 
 178. Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Ross, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893); id. at 378 (explaining that the 
fellow-servant rule was inherently “a question in which the nation as a whole is interested. 
It enters into the commerce of the country”). 
 179. Id. at 390 (Field, J., dissenting) (“The opinion of the majority not only limits and 
narrows the doctrine of the Ross case, but, in effect, denies, even with the limitations 
placed by them upon it, the correctness of its general doctrine	.	.	.	.”); cf. id. (Fuller, C.J., 
dissenting) (“I dissent because, in my judgment, this case comes within the rule laid down 
in Chicago, Milwaukee, & Railway v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, and the decision unreasonably 
enlarges the exemption of the master from liability for injury to one of his servants by the 
fault of another.”). 
 180. Id. at 391 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 394; see, e.g., Chi. City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418 (1862), aff’d, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1866); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 182. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 394 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 183. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 383 (1884) (citing 
“numerous cases, both in this country and in England” as support for the Court’s federal 
general common law ruling); id. at 390 (“There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be 
made in their relation to their common principal, between servants of a corporation 
exercising no supervision over others engaged with them in the same employment and 
agents of the corporation, clothed with the control and management of a distinct 
department, in which their duty is entirely that of direction and superintendence.	.	.	.	This 
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Resuscitating arguments that had been ignored for fifty years, 
Field claimed that (1) the federal government was composed only of 
states, (2) common law could not be adopted without explicit 
legislative enactment, and (3) general common law would 
impermissibly differentiate between state and federal courts in the 
same geography.184 Field also argued that federal general common law 
was “nothing less than an attempt to control the State in a matter in 
which the State was not amenable to Federal authority,” thereby 
violating “the judicial independence of the states” and 
“encroach[ing]	.	.	.	the sovereign rights reserved to them by the Tenth 
Amendment.”185 The most quotable passage of Field’s opinion depicts 
a superficially heartfelt conversion: 
I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of 
repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside 
the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess 
that	.	.	.	I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and 
confidently	.	.	.	repeated the same doctrine. But, 
notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in favor of 
the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with which the 
doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual 
protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United 
States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and 
 
view of his relation to the corporation seems to us a reasonable and just one, and it will 
insure more care in the selection of such agents, and thus give greater security to the 
servants engaged under him in an employment requiring the utmost vigilance on their 
part, and prompt and unhesitating obedience to his orders.” (emphasis added)); id. at 390–
91 (citing Wharton’s treatise on the law of negligence); id. at 394 (“There are decisions in 
the courts of other States, more or less in conformity with those cited from Ohio and 
Kentucky, rejecting or limiting, to a greater or less extent, the master’s exemption from 
liability to a servant for the negligent conduct of his fellows. We agree with them	.	.	.	.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 184. Id. at 393–95; cf. supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (describing similar 
arguments from Swift). 
 185. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 397–99 (Field, J., dissenting). For other examples of Field’s 
extreme assertions of states’ rights in his Baugh dissent, see id. at 401 (“[T]he general 
government and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are 
separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, 
within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme, but the 
States, within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth 
Amendment, ‘reserved,’ are as independent of the general government as that 
government within its sphere is independent of the States.” (quoting Collector v. Day, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870))); see also id. at 402 (“To this autonomy and independence 
of the States their legislation must be as free from coercion as if they were separated 
entirely from connection with the Union. There must also be the like freedom from 
coercion or supervision in the action of their judicial authorities.”). 
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independence of the States—independence in their legislative 
and independence in their judicial departments.186 
This dramatic renunciation, however, is difficult to square with the 
rest of Field’s opinion in Baugh itself, which concludes with a four-page 
defense of Ross based exclusively on federal general common law.187 
Furthermore, Field showed no qualms about applying general common 
law in any subsequent case—any more than Justice Miller did after 
Gelpcke.188 During their own time, the Gelpcke and Baugh dissents 
were nothing more than highly personalized, fringe critiques that were 
not fully explained or consistently applied by even their own authors. 
Unsurprisingly, these opinions had no doctrinal effect on the Court’s 
continued elaboration and application of federal general common law. 
Nonjudicial critiques of federal general common law were equally 
rare and slow to develop. The first published commentary attacking 
Swift appeared in 1873—over thirty years after Swift—and such 
arguments achieved very little popularity for at least another quarter-
century after that.189 Some observers decried Swift, others attacked 
Gelpcke, and a few previewed arguments that would be featured much 
later in Erie.190 
Only a few historians have even noticed this florescence of anti-
Swift commentary, and its timing has never been adequately 
explained.191 The only causal factors mentioned in existing scholarship 
involve the Civil War or some kind of shift in legal thought,192 but each 
of these theories has problems. The Civil War, for example, was never 
mentioned by Swift’s nineteenth-century critics, and it seems 
temporally remote from writings that were authored decades later.193 
 
 186. Id. at 401. 
 187. Id. at 408–11. 
 188. See Oakes v. Mase, 165 U.S. 363, 364 (1897); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 
555, 585 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 189. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100 (collecting sources). Where 
nineteenth-century commentators lodged constitutional objections, they were never linked 
to a specific constitutional provision; instead, commentary relied on abstract theoretical 
arguments about ahistorical first principles. Id. 
 190. Id. at 85–87. 
 191. See id. at 85–100. 
 192. E.g., id. at 93–100 (“The impact of the Civil War itself	.	.	.	was no doubt a 
factor	.	.	.	.”); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 30, at 123 (citing the “legitimation of a 
positivistic judicial philosophy	.	.	.	at the expense of the historical school of 
jurisprudence”); GILMORE, supra note 15, at 93 (stating without explanation that “[t]he 
Swift v. Tyson device, which had over a long period been of great service, had ceased to 
work”). 
 193. See FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100 (collecting sources). 
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By contrast, the character of legal thought changes so frequently that 
such dynamics are hard to associate with any particular stance on Swift. 
Legal thinking surely mutated on many occasions between the 1840s 
and the 1920s, in many different times and places. Upon close scrutiny, 
however, there was a wide assortment of late-nineteenth-century 
characters who criticized Swift, and none of them seemed terribly 
interested in macro-shifts of legal thought—whether such dynamics 
were called positivism, proto-realism, or anything else.194 
One unexplored causal explanation for Swift’s fall from grace 
might emphasize the development of legal institutions during this half-
century. Harvard Law School began retooling American legal 
education in 1870, and new legal publications flourished alongside new 
law schools and bar associations.195 These engines of legal culture 
promoted an image of experts and expertise that was different from 
prior generations. Legal commentary became a more accessible 
enterprise than the one built on Story’s genius, and the new generation 
of written commentary was more intensely nationalized than before.196 
New organizations and publications represented conscious efforts to 
approach law in different ways, and those institutional changes yielded 
new opportunities for some jurists and scholars to challenge Swift’s 
quondam orthodoxy. 
Changes in the publication of professional legal analysis coincided 
with broader political fights concerning federal courts. Federal courts 
were central to debates about freed slaves, and the late 1870s witnessed 
many proposals to limit the availability of diversity jurisdiction, 
especially for corporate litigants.197 In 1880, a congressman from Iowa 
claimed that federal courts “have grown to be largely corporation mills, 
in which the tolls are taken largely from the individual citizen	.	.	.	it has 
become the fact that	.	.	.	the old feudal system	.	.	.	has sought refuge 
behind the judicial system.”198 Likewise, Senator Garland of Arkansas 
lamented that federal courts, in applying Swift-era common law, had 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. See J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 
249–378 (1950); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF 
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 1–6 (1993); CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF 
THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA (1909); 
Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early 
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews,	36 HASTINGS L.J.	739, 750–64 (1985). 
 196. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 195, at 750–63. 
 197. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 79–84; PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 
30, at 15. 
 198. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 80. 
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“done little else than wreck the towns and counties and cities within 
their jurisdiction.”199 Some of these critics emphasized federal decisions 
about municipal bonds and busts, while others worried over personal 
injury suits and insurance claims.200 These objections captured broad 
public frustration, and they also resonated through new institutions of 
professional reason; all of these voices would become more powerful in 
the decades to come. 
The intermingling of law, intellect, and politics that prompted 
Swift’s collapse can be seen quite clearly in the life of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, whose ideas would be prominently featured in Erie.201 Soon 
after graduating law school, Holmes became co-editor of the American 
Law Review, one of the first periodicals to publish a diatribe against 
Swift.202 Holmes also edited a revised edition of Kent’s Commentaries, 
which led him to renounce Swift’s older perspective on common law.203 
Holmes was a paragon for the self-conscious confidence and novelty of 
late-nineteenth-century thought, and his appointment to the Supreme 
Court carried such talents and beliefs into even greater national 
prominence.204 
Justice Holmes manifested his opposition to Swift through dissents 
in three cases: Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Jensen, and Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co.205 In Kuhn, the majority held that “when 
contracts and transactions are entered into[,]	.	.	.	the Federal courts 
properly claim the right to give effect to their own judgment as to what 
is the law of the state	.	.	.	even where a different view has been 
expressed by the state court after the rights of the parties accrued.”206 
 
 199. Id.; see also id. at 81 (“[O]pposition to the Swift doctrine was a major factor 
behind Congressional efforts to limit federal jurisdiction.”). 
 200. See discussion supra note 189. 
 201. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (discussing Holmes’s resistance to 
Swift). 
 202. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE 
INNER LIFE 105, 108, 112–13 (1993). 
 203. Id. at 104–05; see sources cited supra note 126. 
 204. WHITE, supra note 202, at 3–5, 476–88; see id. at 299 (“[W]ith Holmes’ ninetieth 
birthday radio address	.	.	., he had become a rival to Marshall in the pantheon of eminent 
and visible judges	.	.	.	.”). 
 205. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 
218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 206. Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 360 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). As with Swift, 
Gelpcke, Ross, Robbins, and Baugh, the Supreme Court in Kuhn did not rest its judgment 
on an interpretation or reinterpretation of any particular state’s law. Instead, federal 
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But Holmes tossed aside several decades of Swift-era cases with a turn 
of phrase, noting abstract “uncertainty and vacillation” about “the 
theory upon which Swift v. Tyson, and later extensions of its doctrine, 
have proceeded.”207 
Holmes’s Kuhn dissent did not technically attack the results of 
Swift or its progeny, but his logic was simple and broad: (1) all cases 
involving property and tort law must “surely” be governed by state law, 
(2) such law is derived solely from state courts or legislatures, and (3) 
when the Supreme Court “know[s] what the source of the law has said 
that [the result] shall be, our authority is at an end.”208 Contradicting a 
lifetime of precedent, Holmes wrote in conceptual terms that “[t]he law 
of a state does not become something outside of the state court	.	.	.	by 
being called the common law. Whatever it is called, it is the law as 
declared by the state judges, and nothing else.”209 
In Jensen, the Court refused to compensate a stevedore under a 
New York statute because the latter “conflict[ed] with the general 
maritime law.”210 A five-Justice majority held that, “in the absence of 
some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the 
federal courts, constitutes part of our national law.”211 Because general 
maritime law denied recovery, the Court held that a New York statute 
was powerless to do otherwise. Holmes’s dissent was again 
irreconcilable with Swift and prior practice: “If admiralty adopts 
common law rules without an act of Congress	.	.	.	[t]he only authority 
available is the common law or statutes of a state.”212 Holmes 
thundered that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in 
the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign	.	.	.	that can be 
identified	.	.	.	. It always is the law of some state	.	.	.	.”213 
Holmes’s most trenchant critique involved the Taxicab case of 
1928.214 A corporate plaintiff had dissolved in one state and 
reincorporated in another so that it could use federal diversity 
 
courts in these circumstances relied on principles of federal general common law that they 
themselves ultimately created. Id. 
 207. Id. at 370 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 208. Id. at 372. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 212 (majority opinion). 
 211. Id. at 215. 
 212. Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdiction to litigate a contractual dispute.215 Applying “general law,” 
the Supreme Court enforced the contract under federal general 
common law and disregarded state precedent to the contrary.216 For the 
first time, Holmes in his dissent characterized objections to Swift as the 
identification of a “fallacy.” Echoing Field’s rhetoric while making a 
very different argument, Holmes claimed that Swift’s fallacy had 
“resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of 
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of 
opinion should make us hesitate to correct.”217 
Holmes described this fallacy in metaphysical terms, concerning 
the basic conditions of law’s existence. He wrote that, if common law 
were to exist as “one august corpus” located in decisions from various 
courts, “[i]f there were such a transcendental body of law outside any 
particular state but obligatory within it	.	.	.	, the courts of the United 
States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what it 
was.”218 “But,” Holmes wrote with unbending confidence, “there is no 
such body of law.”219 
[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not 
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common 
law	.	.	.	whether called common law or not, is not the common 
law generally, but the law of that state existing by the authority 
of that state and without regard to what it may have been in 
England or anywhere else.220 
According to Holmes, Swift and Story had operated “under the tacit 
domination” of this fallacy, and despite proposing to yet again 
“leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed,” Holmes wished not to “spread 
[its] assumed dominion into new fields.”221 
Late-twentieth-century commentators have viewed Holmes’s 
Taxicab dissent as an apotheosis of pre-Erie criticism of federal 
general common law, but it was never anything like that.222 Holmes 
voiced arguments that were quite different from Miller’s practical 
 
 215. Id. at 522 (majority opinion); cf. FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 26 (noting 
similarly prevalent forum shopping with respect to individuals as early as 1825). 
 216. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 525. 
 217. Id. at 532–33 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 218. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 533–34. 
 221. Id. at 535. 
 222. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on 
Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1787 (1997). 
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concern over state-federal “confliction” and from Field’s Tenth-
Amendment federalism. Nor were Holmes’s twentieth-century 
critiques appreciably stronger than their elders. For example, 
Holmes’s greatest quote of all time was probably “[t]he life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”223 Holmesian attacks 
on federal general common law, however, discarded experience 
entirely and relied on conceptual analysis of “fallacies” and 
“brooding omnipresence.”224 Holmes’s arguments were doctrinally 
muddled as well: he refused to defend or reconcile Swift, but he also 
could not justify overruling it. 
Holmes’s breezy polemics echoed commentary from the 
American Law Review more than it resembled his precursors’ 
judicial opinions.225 He claimed that federal general common law did 
not “exist,” yet that verb was either vague or untrue. How could 
general common law not “exist” when authoritative courts—
including the Taxicab majority—had held otherwise for eighty 
years? Federal judges and marshals—throughout the country and 
even in Iowa—continued to enforce federal general common law as 
law. Such law thus satisfied all of the ordinary criteria for law, 
including loyal adherents, governmental violence, and a legitimating 
ideology.226 
Whatever the substantive weakness of Holmes’s argument, his 
Taxicab dissent quickly became a rallying point for critiques of 
federal courts’ abuse. The idea that corporate litigants could 
manipulate substantive contract law merely by shuffling papers, 
changing state citizenship, and removing their cases to federal court 
became increasingly unacceptable. A wonderful example of this 
criticism appeared in the early federal courts casebook by Felix 
Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz.227 After an anti-Swift polemic and 
 
 223. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1909). 
 224. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532–33; S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 225. Cf. sources cited supra note 188–189 and accompanying text. 
 226. For an exploration of what scholars call “Holmesian positivism,” compare William 
R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. 
REV. 907 (1988), with Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal 
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998), and Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 667–
70. On violence in legal decisionmaking, see Cover, supra note 19, at 1628. 
 227. See generally CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
AND PROCEDURE (Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., Callaghan & Co. 1931) 
(compiling critiques of both abusive federal courts and manipulative corporate litigants). 
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an excerpt from the Taxicab case,228 the authors reproduced the 
following pamphlet: “Why Corporations Leave Home.” 
A good many businessmen know that by incorporating in some 
state other than that of where the business is to be carried on 
the corporation gains the right to bring and defend law suits in 
the Federal courts that might otherwise be tried in the state 
courts	.	.	.	. The opinion is found among both lawyers and 
laymen that in labor cases the United States courts are less 
likely to be affected by local and temporary tides of feeling or 
purely political considerations, while in the protection of 
corporate titles and trade names there seems solid reason for 
expecting more from the Federal than the state courts.229 
According to Frankfurter and Katz, this pamphlet was “printed and 
widely circulated among attorneys” by a company whose “principal 
activities” were to incorporate and manage corporations under the laws 
of Delaware “whose principal business offices are maintained outside 
the state of incorporation.”230 
Policymakers also recognized pro-corporate distortions caused by 
Swift’s federal general common law. One year after the Taxicab 
decision, President Hoover appointed a National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement.231 The study found that a large majority 
of federal diversity actions were tort or contract disputes; of those, 
almost sixty percent involved out-of-state corporate defendants; and 
such out-of-state corporations were defendants in eighty-six percent of 
the suits filed by resident plaintiffs.232 Statistics like these exacerbated 
concern that federal courts were manufacturing defendant-friendly 
doctrines that benefited national corporations and damaged local 
victims.233 Diversity plaintiffs had a lower success rate than any other 
category of litigant—half the success of claimants against the United 
States—and negligence plaintiffs lost more often than anyone.234 
 
 228. Id. at 154 n.3, 159–66. 
 229. Id. at 167. 
 230. Id. at 167 n.2. Frankfurter’s revised casebook, published one year before Erie, 
amplified objections to Swift-era common law by adding discussion of Gelpcke and other 
municipal bond precedents. CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 206–10 & nn.1–4 (Felix Frankfurter & Harry Shulman 
eds., rev. ed. 1937). 
 231. PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 21. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 79–84. 
 234. Id. at 22. 
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All of these developments combined to place federal general 
common law, alongside other pro-business doctrines such as economic 
due process and limited federal commerce power, in the cross-hairs for 
protests that federal courts had distorted American justice and had sold 
out America’s economy.235 Such was the political environment when 
Erie was argued, not six months after the failure of Roosevelt’s “court-
packing plan,” and on the first day in session for Roosevelt’s newest 
appointee, Justice Stanley Reed.236 By 1938, Swift was indeed a 
“headless monster” in Holmesian academic circles.237 But that 
conclusion was debatable at the time, and in any event, it represented 
only Swift’s developmental meaning, which had emerged over a long 
period that is now forgotten. Although Holmes blustered in the 1920s 
that Swift was timeless in its “unconstitutional assumption of powers,” 
it would be a serious mistake for any modern jurist to take such words 
at face value.238 
B. Erie v. Tompkins: Hooray for Our Side 
Erie is one of the best-known cases in American law, yet it 
remains an unsolved puzzle.239 Modern commentary falls in two camps: 
a few interpreters assume that the opinion’s text is the exclusive source 
of Erie’s meaning, while most jurists obscure the text and reconstruct 
Erie on Holmesian foundations.240 This Article will supplement existing 
debates by analyzing the same four categories of historical materials 
discussed above—some of which have been completely ignored with 
respect to Erie—and generating distinctive arguments about the 
decision’s meanings.241 
 
 235. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 148. 
 236. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 105. 
 237. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 61. 
 238. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 239. See Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 595 n.2, 596 n.4 (collecting sources 
discussing Erie). 
 240. Compare Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 596–97 (textualism), with other 
sources cited supra note 30 (nontextual interpretations). Theorists who link Erie with 
separation of powers often claim that federal courts lack authority to “make” federal 
common law. The core premise of such arguments is Holmes’s metaphysical claim that 
“there is no	.	.	.	body of law” in existence that federal judges could apply to such cases. See 
Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532–34. See supra note 226 and accompanying text 
(questioning the accuracy of that premise). 
 241. Although particular historical materials will of course be different for Swift in the 
nineteenth century as compared to Erie in the twentieth century, the interpretive methods 
applied to both cases will be identical. 
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Erie’s facts were simple. Tompkins was hurt while walking beside 
train tracks.242 His lawyer believed that the railroad negligently failed to 
close a train-car door.243 Under Pennsylvania cases, Tompkins was a 
trespasser who could recover only for wanton negligence, which this 
was not. Thus, he sued in federal court and claimed that the railroad’s 
safety standards posed questions of general law, not local law.244 Most 
state courts would have used the doctrine of “permissive pathways” to 
allow pedestrians like Tompkins to recover for ordinary negligence.245 
The district court and Second Circuit in Tompkins’s case reached that 
same conclusion, but they did so as a matter of federal “general law.”246 
1.  Textualism: Declared Meaning 
For modern commentators who seek to defend Erie, the opinion’s 
text is an embarrassment.247 The Court began with fireworks: “The 
question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”248 Textual analysis of the Court’s 
opinion, however, reveals inadequate support for its boldly affirmative 
answer. 
The Court’s opinion contained three separately enumerated 
elements. The first criticized Swift in general terms, citing commentary 
from 1873 to 1923.249 The Court implied without holding that Swift had 
misread the term “laws” in the Rules of Decision Act,250 and the 
opinion cited several academic and professional critiques that discussed 
the Taxicab case.251 Nothing in section one purported to justify 
overruling Swift or upsetting Tompkins’s jury verdict. 
Erie’s second section criticized Swift for producing social and 
political “defects,” while failing to provide appreciable “benefits.”252 
 
 242. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938). 
 243. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 96. 
 244. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 96–97. 
 245. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, Erie, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
 246. Id.; Younger, supra note 30, at 1020–21. 
 247. See Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 602–14. 
 248. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
 249. Id. at 71–74; see FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100. 
 250. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of 
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)). But see 
WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: 
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 79, 148 
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (disputing Warren’s thesis). 
 251. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74. 
 252. Id. at 74. 
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The Court discussed age-old problems about “confliction” among state 
and federal courts, as well as vagueness in separating “general” from 
“local” law.253 The Court also mentioned recent concerns about 
favoring out-of-state corporations, including manipulations of diversity 
jurisdiction (Taxicab) and tort standards (Robbins and Baugh).254 
At the end of section two, the Court explained that all of the 
arguments about Swift’s practical effects were dicta: 
The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or 
limiting diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.	.	.	.	If only a 
question of statutory construction were involved, we should not 
be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the 
course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do 
so.255 
The Court held quite explicitly that, regardless of Swift’s defects or 
benefits as a matter of policy, Erie’s doctrinal result depended 
exclusively and deliberately on constitutional law. 
Erie’s third section offered—in two pages and seven-hundred 
words—the Court’s only constitutional arguments against Swift. The 
majority held that because “Congress has no power” to regulate 
“substantive rules of common law” through legislation, federal courts 
lacked comparable power through adjudication.256 The Court quoted 
states-rights arguments from Justice Field’s Baugh dissent, relying on 
extreme “autonomy and independence of the states.”257 And the 
opinion concluded by referencing the Tenth Amendment without 
citation.258 
Section three blended Field’s arch-federalism with Holmes’s Black 
& White Taxicab dissent, though the two arguments were not at all 
similar.259 For example, because Holmes asserted an intellectual 
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“fallacy” concerning the existence of law, he was less interested in 
Field’s defense of states’ power than he was in limiting federal judges’ 
power to innovate.260 In any event, Holmes never explained how his 
metaphysical analysis of “law in the sense in which courts speak of it 
today” rendered Swift “unconstitutional,”261 and Erie did nothing to 
solve that mystery. Accordingly, the Holmes quotations in Erie remain 
to this day more of a judicial homage than a constitutional argument.262 
From a textualist perspective, the differences between Erie and 
Swift are striking. Swift presented itself as a minor gap-filler that leaned 
heavily on judicial precedents, common-law practice, and economic 
necessity.263 Swift interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to create space 
for the Court’s commercial lawmaking, which meant that every step of 
Swift’s approach was subject to congressional correction. Swift’s 
judgment about commercial paper was federal general common law, 
and its decision that federal courts should apply that judgment was 
federal choice of law. 
By contrast, Erie was a deliberately violent departure from one-
hundred years of precedent, supported by vague references to 
federalism and by quotes from three judicial dissents. Although the 
Court disclaimed “hold[ing] unconstitutional” the Rules of Decision 
Act or any other federal statute, its constitutional basis placed a 
necessary limit on what future legislators could do—including 
reauthorizing Swift’s common law by statute.264 These textual 
characteristics make it all the more interesting to explore how Swift 
became a “monster,” with Erie emerging as a triumphantly vanquishing 
hero. 
2.  Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings 
Erie’s text is cracked if not broken. Because Justice Field’s 
theories of dual sovereignty were rejected long ago, Erie’s modern 
defenders try to minimize the opinion’s Tenth-Amendment verbiage 
about “rights which	.	.	.	are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
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states.”265 The Cult of Holmes remains unmistakably strong, but 
today’s emphasis on interpretive methodology weakens efforts to 
convert his sparkling epithets—“brooding omnipresence” and 
“transcendental law”—into persuasive constitutional arguments.266 
Erie’s textual flaws require other kinds of interpretive material to 
understand this iconic precedent, and this subsection will consider 
Erie’s “implied meaning” based on evidence about the decision’s 
lawyers, judges, and contemporary audience. 
a. Lawyers 
We have seen that the lawyers in Swift argued their case as though 
it were a mountain, but the Court decided a molehill.267 The opposite 
was true in Erie. No lawyer had suggested that “the oft-challenged 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should be disapproved.”268 Nor did anyone 
but the Supreme Court foresee that as even a possibility. The district 
judge—a Roosevelt appointee hearing his first civil case—had applied 
federal general common law without hesitation.269 And a Second 
Circuit panel that included Learned Hand and Thomas Swan had 
unanimously used federal general common law with casual 
confidence.270 
Even in the Supreme Court, the litigating parties focused on minor 
details: When the train struck, was Tompkins parallel to the tracks or 
walking diagonally?271 Did lower courts misread the federal general 
common law of contributory negligence?272 Exactly how settled was 
Pennsylvania’s rejection of the “permissive pathways” doctrine?273 
None of the lawyers sensed that Erie might be a bombshell, and even 
the railroad’s brief referenced “persistent criticisms of Swift v. Tyson” 
only en route to showing that such critiques were “misdirected.”274 For 
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both sides, the main puzzle was to understand why the Court chose to 
hear the case at all.275 
The railroad did try to somewhat limit the application of Swift and 
its successors, claiming that the dividing line between general and local 
law should be whether relevant state cases were firmly established.276 
On this approach, general common law would apply in federal and 
state courts alike, but only for undecided questions. When doctrine is 
firmly established, state courts are duty bound to follow past 
precedents instead of general principles, and Erie’s lawyers claimed 
that federal courts should do the same.277 
Tompkins replied with a barrage of Supreme Court decisions that 
had ignored settled state law.278 Echoing the bond cases, Tompkins 
wrote that “[t]he ultimate aim of both [state and federal courts] is 
justice, and where a State Court has gone astray, to compel Federal 
adhesion to such injustice is not only to destroy the judicial function 
but to make a feti[s]h of legalistic conflicts principles.”279 Tompkins 
claimed that, even if the Court was sometimes vague in separating local 
and general law, a broad standard was the right one: “Let the Federal 
Courts exercise their own judgment on all principles of general law, 
except where local rules of property,	.	.	.	[or] peculiar local 
customs	.	.	.	have grown up.”280 
Erie’s constitutional arguments were never briefed or argued, and 
this was because the experienced lawyers on the scene—including the 
district judge and Second Circuit panel—unanimously failed to 
anticipate Erie’s result or rationale in any way.281 Though some 
intellectuals had criticized Swift for nearly sixty-five years, there was no 
signal that the case might be overruled until Brandeis’s opinion was 
announced from the bench.282 
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To construe Erie’s arguments as inevitable or necessary is victors’ 
history soaked in hindsight. Some theorists viewed Swift as a “headless 
monster” at the time,283 but the lawyers and judges who participated in 
Erie missed that memo. Erie’s litigative context shows that the decision 
was not compelled by a consensus shift in legal thinking any more than 
Swift was compelled by a consensus view of financial necessity.284 Swift 
had weathered critiques since 1873, and when Erie came, it shocked its 
participants like a thunderbolt.285 The Court’s decision was not the 
lingering consequence of a civil war, nor was it some natural dawn that 
had gradually broken Swift’s jurisprudential darkness. Instead, Erie was 
a historically contingent product of the Court and its members at the 
time. 
b. Judges 
In search of originalist context, Erie’s interpreters have often 
turned to biography, as Louis Brandeis is among America’s most 
famous judges, and Erie is his most famous opinion.286 This subsection 
considers the virtues and flaws of seeking Erie’s implied meaning based 
on details about its author. Edward Purcell’s book, Brandeis and the 
Progressive Constitution, offers a strong argument for viewing Erie this 
way, and his thesis appears in striking terms: 
Most immediately, [Erie] was due to Brandeis. The Court’s 
decision was largely due to his drive to overrule Swift, and its 
opinion was almost wholly due to his insistence that it 
rest	.	.	.	on specific constitutional grounds of his own choosing. 
Erie was, perhaps to an unusual degree, a decision of the 
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Supreme Court that embodied the well-considered and 
fundamental constitutional theory of only a single justice.287 
A major consequence of treating Erie and Brandeis as exactly 
identical is to displace a textualist focus on states-rights federalism in 
favor of an originalist analogy to authorial intent. In this Article’s 
terminology, Purcell seeks to focus on Erie’s implied meaning rather 
than its declared meaning, and that choice of methodology has serious 
substantive consequences. Like many modernists, Purcell seeks to 
shelve Erie’s awkward text in order to interpret the case based on 
broad constitutional principles—such as judicial restraint and 
separation of powers—that a “good progressive” like Brandeis might 
have endorsed.288 According to Purcell, Brandeis’s Erie opinion 
“implemented the Progressive values that he had absorbed, nourished, 
and articulated for a lifetime[, especially including] what he regarded as 
the compatible causes of social justice, organizational efficiency, and 
popular government.”289 
Purcell insists that interpreters can be misled by reading Erie too 
closely, as the opinion’s botched language could muddy the 
constitutionally progressive truth that lies beneath.290 There is no 
denying that Erie quotes Justice Field’s dual-sovereignty federalism 
and uses language from the Tenth Amendment, but Purcell insists that 
such elements do not represent what Brandeis stood for in life.291 
Therefore, they cannot describe what his judicial masterwork really 
meant.292 
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A second consequence of Purcell’s biographical approach stems 
from his conclusion that Erie’s implied meaning was properly 
understood for only a brief period of time.293 Purcell portrays Brandeis 
as a singularly personal link between Holmes’s critique of Swift’s 
theoretical “fallacies” and socially progressive constitutionalism.294 The 
climax of Brandeisian jurisprudence, however, had nearly passed when 
Erie was decided. Brandeis left the Court within a year, and he died in 
1941.295 By Purcell’s account, the centralization surrounding World 
War II altered “the landscape of American life	.	.	.	dramatically,” such 
that Brandeis’s “political rhetoric of ‘Progressivism’ suddenly appeared 
quaint and even archaic.”296 For this reason, Purcell’s book is largely 
dedicated to explaining how the Brandeisian “original Erie” was 
coopted and distorted after just a few years by subsequent theories and 
political movements.297 
To appreciate disputes over how to characterize Erie’s implied 
meaning, one might consider a different biographical interpretation, 
drawn from Anthony Freyer’s book Harmony and Dissonance.298 
Freyer views the Court’s Erie opinion not as espousing Brandeis’s own 
idiosyncratic progressivism, but as a confluence point for Swift’s critics 
over a broader timespan.299 Erie cited a variety of sources: from the 
arch-Texan Robert Street to Field’s rant in Baugh, from the urbane 
theorizing of John Chipman Gray to Charles Warren’s statutory 
research.300 Freyer’s image of an eclectic Brandeis who “gathered his 
citations” describes a fastidious quote-clipper more than a visionary 
progressive prophet.301 
Some difficulties with biographical analysis of Erie are somewhat 
endemic to biography as a genre. For example, the personalized subject 
of a biography can be celebrated, simplified, or given inflated 
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importance.302 Bulky organizing labels—including Purcell’s 
“progressivism”—often do not fit particular individuals very well.303 
And it can be hard to connect any individual’s life with collectively 
written products like Supreme Court opinions. 
Problems of this sort become particularly evident if one considers 
Brandeis’s colleagues, who played various important roles in producing 
the Erie majority. For instance, an early Brandeis draft described the 
Court’s constitutional ruling very tentatively: “We need not determine 
whether the objections disclosed by experience are alone sufficient 
reason for abandoning [Swift].”304 It was a comment from Justice Stone 
that pushed Brandeis to write more forcefully: “If only a question of 
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to 
abandon [Swift].”305 Likewise, Chief Justice Hughes caused Brandeis to 
add longer quotations from Field than he had planned, and it was 
Hughes who first said at conference: “If we wish to overrule Swift v. 
Tyson, here is our opportunity.”306 
Even Justice Butler in dissent influenced the Court by requesting 
clarification of “precisely the principle or provision of the Constitution 
held to have been transgressed.”307 Brandeis replied with Tenth-
Amendment rhetoric concerning “rights” that were “reserved	.	.	.	to the 
several states.”308 And, indeed, it was the physically failing Justice 
Cardozo who made certiorari possible in the first place by granting the 
railroad a preliminary stay.309 Insofar as all of these different people—
with all of their disparate goals and beliefs—were significant in Erie’s 
creation, then Brandeis cannot be retrofitted as the decision’s single 
interpretive compass. 
A similar challenge concerns the uneasy relationship between 
“Brandeis’s constitutional progressivism” and the non-Brandeisian, 
nonprogressive words in Erie’s decisive third section. As a matter of 
intellectual genealogy, Holmes’s dissents echo nineteenth-century 
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commentary, and section three of Erie embraces Holmes. Yet Holmes 
had a conflicted relationship with “progressivism,” and Swift’s early 
critics were not progressives by any metric—nor was Field in Baugh.310 
Perhaps the correct answer is to acknowledge, contrary to 
Purcell’s thesis, that Erie’s decisive repudiation of Swift had no 
necessary or enduring connection with Brandeisian progressivism. 
Every word in part three could have been written by a nonprogressive 
jurist like Holmes or Street, and some words that Brandeis chose to 
include in that section were not progressive at all. Methodological and 
substantive tensions between the textualism of Erie’s declared meaning 
and the originalism of the decision’s implied meaning could hardly be 
more starkly represented. 
To read Erie as its author’s creation is obviously correct in one 
sense, but there are many ways to interpret that fact. One could follow 
Purcell’s invitation and deemphasize text in favor of idealized 
biography. One could embrace Freyer by haphazardly mixing 
Brandeis’s progressive motivations with states-rights federalism and 
abstract theories. Or one could conclude that, whatever the opinion’s 
author intended to say, Erie was simply not well drafted. Using 
Brandeis’s personal experiences to interpret Erie may be attractive for 
modern interpreters who happen to appreciate his legacy more than 
that of Field or even Holmes. But political imperatives to redeem Erie 
as a fundamentally desirable precedent cannot resolve interpretive 
questions about how biographical analysis should fit with other 
historical materials, including the Court’s textual opinion itself. 
c. Contemporary Reactions 
Erie’s puzzling text and fractured context led the Harvard Law 
Review to the remarkable understatement that “[t]he opinion in Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins lacks much of the precision which an important 
reexamination of constitutional distribution of power might be 
expected to contain.”311 That reaction, however, represented only the 
smallest part of Erie’s contemporary audience. Even vocal critics of the 
Court’s constitutional argument believed that they understood the 
decision—including Felix Frankfurter, a friend and associate of 
Brandeis, who would soon join the Court himself.312 In 1938, then-
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Professor Frankfurter wrote privately that he “disagree[d] in toto with 
Brandeis’ constitutional view as to Swift v. Tyson” because Erie had 
wrongly relied on the Tenth Amendment and extremist federalism.313 
Most early commentators were also critical, if they bothered to 
mention Erie’s constitutional holding at all.314 
Erie did not win immediate fans based on what Purcell has called 
its progressive constitutionalism, yet some observers did eventually 
appreciate the decision’s significance. Initially, Erie was thoroughly 
unmentioned by general circulation periodicals.315 In May 1938, 
however, Justice Stone told journalist Arthur Krock that Erie was “the 
most important opinion since I have been on the court,” sparking 
several national newspaper articles.316 Krock later wrote that his own 
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Erie article had generated a responsive “shower of approving letters 
from lawyers.”317 
Frankfurter sought to further boost Erie’s public profile by writing 
to President Roosevelt on April 27: 
I certainly didn’t expect to live to see the day when the Court 
would announce, as they did on Monday, that it itself has 
usurped power for nearly a hundred years. And think of not a 
single New York paper—at least none that I saw—having a 
nose for the significance of such a decision.318 
In July 1938, Solicitor General Robert Jackson delivered a lecture to an 
American Bar Association section entitled “The Rise and Fall of Swift 
v. Tyson.”319 Jackson’s speech celebrated Swift’s demise, yet he also 
refused to endorse Erie’s constitutional reasoning.320 
Even as journalists trumpeted Erie’s significance and impact, they 
wrote surprisingly little that the general public could understand. There 
was no discussion, for example, of federal general common law’s effect 
on corporate litigation, municipal bonds, or workplace accidents.321 Nor 
did newspaper accounts recoil at what one writer called “State Rights 
Reasserted.”322 Despite the Tenth Amendment’s obvious and 
acknowledged appearance, no contemporary public discussion ever 
linked Erie with pre-New Deal federalism. To be sure, Erie was not 
celebrated as an instance of anti-corporate progressivism, but its 
apparent revival of states-rights ideology also was not construed as 
resuscitating discredited jurisprudential principles from the previous 
decade. 
This historical record seems to indicate that the press and public 
interpreted Erie alongside other seismic changes at the Court in 1938—
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throws incalculable emphasis on the States as the vital and sovereign units in the 
American form of government.”); Supreme Court Admits an Error: Decision of 1842 
Reversed in Opinion Handed Down by Justice Brandeis, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, May 1, 1938, 
at C4. 
 317. Krock, Final TVA-Utilities Settlement Seems Nearer, supra note 316, at 20. 
 318. Younger, supra note 30, at 1029. 
 319. Jackson, supra note 275, at 609. 
 320. See id. at 644; Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 813 (2013). 
 321. Even the “romance” of Warren’s statutory research drew more press than these 
issues of national legal policy. Krock, More About the Epochal Tompkins Decision, supra 
note 316, at 22. 
 322. Krock, A Momentous Decision of the Supreme Court, supra note 316, at 22. 
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though Erie is seldom viewed in this light by modern audiences.323 For 
decades, federal courts had been pilloried as subverting democratic 
control and economic health.324 National judges were seen as captives 
of formalism and constitutional purity that had invalidated legislative 
reforms and damaged ordinary Americans, with Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan as a high-water mark of such political critique.325 
In this highly volatile context, Erie offered a sudden public 
apology—“voluntarily” and quite unsolicited, as the newspapers 
wrote—that explicitly renounced its predecessors’ longstanding 
jurisprudence as unconstitutional.326 Brandeis and Holmes had been 
dissenters on issues of federal general common law as recently as 
1928.327 Ten years later, reinforced by Roosevelt’s appointees, their 
views now ruled the Court, and it was the old regime’s holdover 
“Horsemen” who fulminated in dissent. The New Deal’s good guys had 
won again, and constitutional progress marched on with confidence. 
Perhaps the public and press did not need to know much more than 
that. 
Erie’s radical judgment fueled different reactions among various 
groups. Legal practitioners saw the case as a major development in 
their clients’ battles over federal general common law, which had lasted 
for a half-century.328 Legal academics attacked the Court for shoddy 
reasoning, if not bad results.329 And although the press seemed pleased 
with Erie, it is less clear what their readership truly understood about 
the case. 
For interpretive purposes, these reactions to Erie from its time are 
extremely useful in contradicting certain modern views of the decision. 
For example, no one in 1938 celebrated Erie as a grand case involving 
separation of powers, dual-sovereignty federalism, or Brandeisian 
progressivism. Evidence of Erie’s understood meaning makes it harder 
to accept that, for example, Erie’s great progressive holding fell in the 
 
 323. Compare, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192, 769 (5th 
ed. 2013) (discussing major constitutional shifts in the late 1930s without mentioning Erie), 
with, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 509–10 (5th ed. 2013) (presenting Erie without mentioning contemporary 
changes in constitutional law). 
 324. PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 26. 
 325. Id. at 218; cf. id. at 26 (quoting Sen. Robert LaFollette’s view of federal courts as 
“a Frankenstein which must be destroyed”). 
 326. Supreme Court Admits an Error, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, supra note 316, at C4. 
 327. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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woods without anyone hearing it at the time. Likewise, Erie’s 
purportedly constitutional basis was viewed as the decision’s most 
disfavored element, and also its least important. The grand 
‘constitutional Erie’ that has sparked so much modern controversy 
lacks any basis in the original history of 1938; instead, we shall see that 
it was the novel creation of legal-process scholars in the 1950s and 
political conservatives in the 1980s. 
3.  Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning 
Tracing Erie’s developmental meaning is difficult not only because 
the story spans eighty years, but also because it concludes in the 
ambiguous present. This subsection will consider three categories of 
post-hoc reactions—from courts, commentators, and policymakers—
that have contributed to make Erie what it is today. 
Federal courts’ reaction to Erie was uniformly and immediately 
positive.330 President Roosevelt appointed six new Justices after Erie, 
and all of them focused on implementing the decision rather than 
undermining it.331 Judges debated Erie’s scope, but not its correctness; 
thus, the Court quickly addressed how to interpret unsettled state law, 
how Erie applied to conflicts of law, and Erie’s relationship to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.332 These questions were resolved in 
exclusively practical terms, eschewing constitutional arguments that 
some Justices (i.e., Reed and Frankfurter) had never embraced, and 
that other Justices (i.e., Wiley Rutledge and Frank Murphy) were 
inclined to hedge or shelve.333 
 
 330. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1938); Bash v. Balt. & O.R. 
Co., 102 F.2d 48, 49 (3d Cir. 1939); see, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 757–61 
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v. Mississippi, 97 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1938); Deslauriers Steel Mould Co. v. Gangaway, 
97 F.2d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 1938); Hack v. Am. Sur. Co., 96 F.2d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 1938). None 
of these discussed Erie’s constitutional basis. 
 331. These appointees were Felix Frankfurter (1939), William Douglas (1939), Frank 
Murphy (1940), James Byrnes (1941), Robert Jackson (1941), and Wiley Rutledge (1943). 
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–2012 (Clare 
Cushman ed., 2013). 
 332. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Fidelity Union Tr. Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 172 
(1940). 
 333. See supra notes 313 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Frankfurter, 
J.); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part); Guar. 
Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 113 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting, joined by Murphy, J.). 
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Ever since 1938, the Court has struggled to distinguish state 
“substantive” law from federal “procedural” law,334 yet the Court has 
never again relied on Erie’s indecipherably weak constitutional basis.335 
To the contrary, the Court has synthesized Erie’s “twin aims” as 
entirely practical entities: “discouragement of forum shopping and 
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”336 Furthermore, 
even as applicable doctrinal tests have become tangled over the years, 
no judicial opinion has suggested overruling Erie; instead, through 
decades of unbroken application and repetition, the case has only 
increased in doctrinal prominence.337 
Compared to Erie’s consistently positive judicial reception, 
academic commentary has been diverse and unstable. Some academics 
in the decades after Erie shared Frankfurter’s view that the case was 
rightly decided but wrongly reasoned.338 Another group objected that 
Erie limited federal courts’ independence, transforming them into a 
kind of “ventriloquist’s dummy to the courts of some particular 
state.”339 One professor even claimed that Erie’s repudiation of 
“general common law” undermined the standard law school practice 
(that continues today) of studying torts, property, and contracts 
without any state-specific focus.340 
Even as federal courts ignored Erie’s constitutional basis, 
however, a central figure in the academy attempted a grand 
reconstruction. Henry Hart was a founding influence in the “legal 
process” movement, and he co-authored the greatest casebook in 
American history.341 Many post-war academics expressed confidence in 
their ability to design systems that, aided by properly examined facts, 
 
 334. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 
(2010). 
 335. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. of Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–27 (1996). But cf., 
e.g., Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415–16 (invoking metaphysics and referring to Erie’s 
“constitutional source”). 
 336. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 337. E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011); Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740–41 (2004). 
 338. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 216–28 (collecting sources). 
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Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 284 (1946). 
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 341. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 688 (1989) (book review) 
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could beneficially organize human life.342 Hart’s sweeping theories 
about American governance—and especially federal courts—amply 
reflected this self-assured tone. 
Hart offered a rationalized and panoramic view of state and 
federal legislatures and courts. Whereas Frankfurter saw diversity 
jurisdiction as a quaint vestige or mistake, Hart saw it as a reminder of 
national unity and interstate activity under law. In their exercise of 
diversity jurisdiction, elite and disinterested federal judges, aided by 
efficient federal procedures, were able to deliver a “juster justice than 
state courts.”343 On the other hand, Hart did believe that full 
adjudicative creativity was appropriate only in federal cases that 
applied federal substantive law.344 
For Hart, Erie therefore struck the perfect balance and was 
“superbly right” in requiring federal courts to follow state common-law 
precedents.345 Hart articulated a “logic of federalism” that arranged 
state and federal courts within reasoned spheres of pluralist 
decisionmaking.346 In Hart’s view, the “perpetual confliction” that had 
plagued Swift v. Tyson was more than a pragmatic nuisance.347 He saw 
the application of “inconsistent systems of law” in the same geographic 
space as positive proof that Swift’s legal architecture was irretrievably 
flawed.348 
Hart’s core notion was that all legal institutions have a proper, 
defined, and orderly role. Hart thought that some post-Erie decisions 
went too far in making federal courts “only another court of the 
state,”349 yet he deserves recognition as the first true theorist of Erie. 
For although Hart claimed fidelity to “the foundations of principle of 
Justice Brandeis’ opinion”—as opposed to its textual terms—he 
offered under that banner a truly novel analysis of adjudication, 
federalism, the “constitutional plan,” and nearly everything else.350 
A different approach to Erie appeared in the American Law 
Institute’s Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and 
 
 342. Steven Schryer, Fantasies of the New Class: The New Criticism, Harvard 
Sociology, and the Idea of the University, 122 PMLA 663, 666–69 (2007). 
 343. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 246. 
 344. Id. at 244–45. 
 345. Id. at 247. 
 346. Id. at 248–49. 
 347. Id. at 247 (discussing Hart’s views); see supra note 75 and accompanying text 
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 348. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 247. 
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Federal Courts in 1969.351 Chief Justice Warren had called for systemic 
analysis of state and federal courts in “light of the basic principles of 
federalism,” and the report offered exactly that.352 The study applied 
legal-process methodologies but disagreed with Hart, concluding that 
federal courts should generally avoid diversity jurisdiction’s 
“undesirable interference with state autonomy,” just as “questions of 
federal law are [typically] best left to the federal courts.”353 
The ALI study begrudgingly stated that, “[i]f Erie had a 
constitutional base, it was the absence of federal legislative power as to 
the run of factual situations presented in diversity cases.”354 Yet the 
authors viewed Erie as a manifestly second-best alternative to reducing 
or eliminating diversity jurisdiction altogether. Thus, the report 
strongly advocated “the basic proposition that federal courts should 
not be called upon for the application of state law.”355 
Almost fifty years of Erie commentary can be organized by 
comparing Hart’s writings to the ALI’s study. One set of academics, 
like Hart, have ingeniously discovered large parts of their own 
intellectual theories hidden between the lines of Erie’s great and 
powerful ruling.356 Such writers embrace Erie as a case worth 
celebrating, but only on the authors’ own terms (federalism, separation 
of powers, or conflicts of law), and often without much attention to 
historical text or context.357 A second set of commentators has followed 
the ALI by quietly ignoring or accepting Erie’s vague constitutional 
basis, while prioritizing instead Frankfurter’s practical focus on forum 
shopping and unfairness.358 
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Perhaps the most important aspect of Erie’s developmental 
meaning has been its enduring practical effect on diversity jurisdiction. 
With only a few exceptions,359 Erie’s elimination of federal general 
common law has defanged political fights over diversity jurisdiction, 
making that institution safe—almost boring—in the decades to follow. 
Before Erie, many politicians and commentators had clamored to 
restrict or abolish diversity jurisdiction, especially insofar as the latter 
symbolized pro-corporate abuse.360 After 1938, however, diversity 
jurisdiction changed from a political hot button to a harmless oddity.361 
Although there remain differences today between state courts and 
federal courts, post-Erie variations seem mild and inoffensive by 
comparison to the “confliction” that Swift produced.362 Erie ended the 
Taxicab-style application of flagrantly different substantive law to 
identical cases in courthouses just blocks apart.363 And a vital 
precondition for political objections to Swift’s “forum shopping” was 
that litigants as well as the public had to identify circumstances where 
the federal forum would make a difference—otherwise the public could 
not know what to protest. With one stroke, Erie drastically reduced 
those differences’ number, scope, and public visibility. 
4.  Lessons Learned: Erie as Regime Change 
Everything that modern lawyers think they know about Erie 
emerged years and decades after the fact. Erie’s current meaning exists 
within an elaborate cultural framework that students, lawyers, and 
scholars use to interpret the case. Erased from popular memory are 
Lochner-era notions of state sovereignty that were originally inscribed 
as the decision’s justification. Lost are commitments to constitutional 
arguments that the Court once viewed as both comfortable and 
necessary. Forgotten is the radicalism of discarding a century of 
precedent that no litigant had challenged or defended. Faded are the 
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generational and constitutional politics that were once unmistakably 
crisp. 
By comparison to its complex history, today’s Erie is a cartoon: a 
monument to whiskered Holmesian genius, penned by the self-
restrained Brandeis, and bolstered by hard-boiled practicalities of 
forum shopping. Hardly anyone cares about Erie’s constitutional 
analysis, and only experts wonder how the Court—especially 
Brandeis—could embrace such poorly crafted arguments.364 Erie never 
needed a constitutional basis,365 which makes the Court’s decision to 
produce one even more surprising. This Article has used unnoticed 
historical evidence and untried analytical techniques to challenge 
conventional interpretations of Erie as an iconic case. Our last topic in 
this subsection is to examine how such a reinterpretation of Erie casts 
revisionist light on this period of Supreme Court history as a whole. 
This Article has characterized Erie’s original meaning as a 
politicized generational rivalry between twentieth-century 
revolutionaries and a demonized old guard.366 In the 1950s, however, 
legal-process scholars’ obsession with self-restraint obscured Erie’s 
assertiveness in its own time. Insofar as one recovers an originalist 
version of Erie, that reinterpretation could destabilize broader images 
of the New Deal Court as constitutionally “passive” as opposed to 
“activist.”367 
Ordinary descriptions of the 1930s characterize Justices Brandeis, 
Cardozo, and Stone as internalizing objections to Lochner and 
therefore instructing courts to uphold legislative expressions of 
democratic will.368 According to this familiar tale, Roosevelt appointed 
new judges, Roberts “switched in time,” and the Court turned an 
institutional corner, eschewing rootless doctrines such as freedom of 
contract and substantive due process.369 The post-1937 Court was 
supposedly different from its predecessor because the new crop of 
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judges steadfastly refused to manipulate the Constitution in the service 
of their own normative visions.370 
The New Deal Court never matched this image of jurisprudential 
discipline, as one can see by comparing an originalist view of Erie with 
its celebrated companion case, United States v. Carolene Products.371 In 
Carolene Products, the makers of “Milnut” challenged a federal statute 
that criminalized their blend of skim milk and coconut oil. The 
producers claimed that combining milk and vegetable fat was a 
perfectly safe commodity that should be freely bought and sold 
wherever market forces allowed.372 
The Court’s holding and its now-famous footnote four were a 
manifesto for the new legal regime, as the majority announced 
sweeping principles that were entirely unnecessary to the case.373 For 
example, the Court bracketed and set aside the extensive congressional 
record that supported the Filled Milk Act, just so it could declare 
hypothetically that “in the absence of such [legislative] aids, the 
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed.”374 The Court further proclaimed, with remarkable breadth, 
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions 
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless	.	.	.	[one can] preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”375 This was a clear and 
conscious departure from Lochner-era skepticism of legislative 
policymaking. 
Even more expansively, footnote four of Carolene Products 
explained that other cases—which might affect constitutionally 
protected groups, liberties, and political processes—might require 
“more exacting scrutiny” and “more searching judicial inquiry” than 
mere regulation of Milnut.376 Modern observers have called footnote 
four “the great and modern charter” of American constitutional law, 
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endorsing strong protection for liberty and equality, while requiring 
judicial deference on topics of economic and social policy.377 The 
Court’s effort to prescribe a doctrinal architecture for every application 
of judicial review—especially as footnoted dicta in a case about 
coconut-fattened milk—represents judicial boldness of the highest 
order. 
In Carolene Products, the Court itself crafted both sides of the 
equation—the commitment to judicial restraint as well as the 
protection of individual rights—thereby indicating the majority’s own 
view of when and where judges should act. Historians once 
characterized the Revolution of 1937 as a craven surrender to 
Roosevelt’s court-packing pressure, but that was profoundly wrong.378 
The Court’s decisions obviously represented not merely the President’s 
or the public’s view of the Constitution; they also reflected ideas of the 
Justices themselves. The late 1930s embodied a constitutional 
reformulation by the Court, rather than simply the puppeteering of 
other political agents. Even at the height of their so-called “restraint,” 
Roosevelt’s new Justices profoundly revised constitutional 
jurisprudence and unhorsed an older legal regime that had been 
dominant throughout their adult lives.379 
A revisionist account of Erie—produced with new techniques and 
evidence—confirms beyond any doubt that, alongside notions of 
judicial restraint, the New-Deal Court embraced immense judicial 
boldness, and it did so well beyond the parameters prescribed by 
Carolene Products.380 The Erie majority collected and invented 
constitutional arguments without hesitation. Erie was nothing like the 
chastened application of passive virtues that subsequent legal-process 
scholars would urgently desire.381 
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Nor did the Erie decision claim any plausible link to individual 
rights or democratic process.382 Instead, Erie’s result issued from a 
Court that was remarkably free to pursue its own constitutional vision. 
Newly appointed Justices had spent their careers watching the Court 
implement constitutional beliefs of then-sitting Justices.383 They had 
seen Congress and President Roosevelt promote a constitutionally 
transformative agenda for federal governance.384 And Roosevelt had 
dramatically threatened separation of powers by trying to alter the 
number of Justices in order to serve his political ends.385 
In the abstract, New-Deal Justices could have reacted to those 
events with self-restrained caution about employing broad 
constitutional arguments. Having seen the consequences of judicial 
abuse, the Court could have renounced aggression altogether, perhaps 
only with exceptions enumerated under Carolene Products. But that is 
not the historical record. In Erie, Carolene Products, and elsewhere 
during this period, the legal-process narrative of New Deal restraint 
appeared only after front-line combat with the old regime was 
complete.386 As contemporary support for this jurisprudential image, 
consider the Harvard Law Review’s marvelous analysis of Erie in 1938: 
In holding that for nearly a century it had pursued an 
“unconstitutional” “course” by following Swift v. Tyson in an 
unbroken line of decisions, the Supreme Court has made a 
startling avowal. Reserving comment we now note only the 
gratuitous courage of the Court and the fluidity of the 
Constitution.387 
Perhaps only in 1938 could such “gratuitous courage” and 
constitutional “fluidity” have been celebrated so explicitly and 
earnestly.388 Basic constitutional principles had become flexible, and 
the new Court was more pleased than ashamed in announcing that fact. 
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II.  MEANINGS-IN-PROGRESS: WINDSOR AND OBERGEFELL 
Part I examined iconic cases from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in order to identify different modes of interpretation and 
their various doctrinal consequences. Such schemes might seem 
inherently valuable to intellectuals, especially as they transform 
broader understandings of Supreme Court history.389 But practicing 
lawyers and judges will also see pieces on a chess board. Interpretive 
techniques and evidence can be applied to many doctrinal puzzles, and 
systematic modes of interpretation (textualism, originalism, living 
precedentialism) can be used for debates over interpreting any set of 
vague and powerful precedents. 
This Part solidifies precedential interpretation as a general 
theory—not just a revisionist account of Erie and Swift—by considering 
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, two cases from the 
ephemeral present rather than the excavated past. We have seen that 
applying new interpretive techniques to old and familiar cases can 
dramatically revise conventional wisdom. But interpretive 
methodologies are also useful for understanding new iconic precedents. 
Because so much more historical evidence is available concerning Swift 
and Erie, the modern project of interpreting Windsor and Obergefell 
should be relatively open and unsettled. Lawyers and judges have 
struggled greatly over Windsor’s meaning, and debates about 
Obergefell continue today.390 Applying the same techniques we have 
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discussed will illustrate—despite scarce historical materials and with 
suitably briefer discussion—how precedential interpretation may 
proceed for Windsor, Obergefell, or any other important, ambiguous 
icon that may appear in the future. 
To be explicit, nothing in the following analysis depends on 
whether Windsor or Obergefell in fact remain enduring icons. My 
purpose is to analyze the moment when each of these cases did seem 
important and vague, thereby offering a template that can be used to 
interpret other precedents with similar characteristics. 
In its own time, Windsor embodied the notion of “iconic cases” 
exceptionally well. Windsor was the Supreme Court’s most outspoken 
decision involving sexual orientation and same-sex marriage, which in 
turn represents one of the greatest civil rights debates in this century.391 
Yet we shall see that the Court’s textual explanation was so flawed that 
other interpretive tools were needed to understand what the decision 
meant. Indeed, nontextual interpretations of Windsor were crucial in 
producing Obergefell. And although Obergefell answered the biggest 
doctrinal question left open in Windsor, it has now raised other 
doctrinal puzzles that remain vague and will require precedential 
interpretation. 
One cannot know how or when some other case will emerge that 
transforms or displaces Windsor and Obergefell as iconic cases, but that 
is emphatically not the point. Tomorrow will become history soon 
enough. For now, it is sufficient to consider what advanced interpretive 
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techniques can reveal about two of the most difficult and interesting 
Supreme Court decisions in recent memory. 
A. Windsor v. United States: An Iconic Practice Run? 
As with constitutional and statutory textualism, to focus on 
Windsor’s declared meaning draws a useful separation between what 
the decision-maker said and what a later audience might wish to hear. 
The distinction between textual and nontextual interpretation is 
especially important for politically charged issues like same-sex 
marriage, and this Section will consider the Windsor opinion’s textual 
flaws because—much like Erie, Brown, or Marbury—they imply a 
demand for interpretive materials outside the judicial text. 
1.  Textualism: Declared Meaning 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Canada, and they 
lived as a married couple under the laws of New York.392 When Spyer 
died, her property went to Windsor, who claimed tax exemption as a 
“surviving spouse.”393 The federal government denied that exemption 
based on the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which declared 
that, in every federal statute, the word “marriage” should include only 
“a legal union between one man and one woman” and “spouse” should 
include only members of an opposite-sex marriage.394 Windsor 
challenged that denial on equal protection grounds.395 The Supreme 
Court ruled five to four in Windsor’s favor, and the text of Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion blended three constitutional themes. 
Windsor’s first textual theme was constitutional equality. The 
Court held that DOMA “single[d] out” same-sex marriages and 
“impose[d] a disability” by declaring them “less worthy than the 
marriages of others.”396 DOMA’s refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriage was “unusual” because it created disparities between the 
treatment of couples under federal statutory law and state family law.397 
The Court saw such disparities as unconstitutionally broad and 
“motived by an improper animus or purpose.”398 
 
 392. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, §	3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 
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A second textual theme concerned liberty. The Court held that 
failing to recognize Windsor’s marriage inflicted an “injury and 
indignity” that constituted a “deprivation of an essential part of the 
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”399 The majority went 
beyond the doctrine of “reverse incorporation,” which applies equal 
protection to the federal government, and stated explicitly that DOMA 
“violate[d] basic due process and equal protection principles.”400 The 
Court also declared that, “[w]hile the Fifth Amendment itself 
withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the 
way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific 
and all the better understood and preserved.”401 The Court did not 
clarify how the nineteenth-century term “equal protection” could 
possibly make the eighteenth-century term “due process” more 
“specific” or “better understood and preserved.”402 Nor did the opinion 
explain how future courts should analyze this interaction between 
constitutional equality and liberty. 
Windsor’s third and most curious theme was federalism. The 
Court emphasized that “[b]y history and tradition the definition and 
regulation of marriage	.	.	.	has been treated as being within the 
authority and realm of the separate States.”403 The Court 
acknowledged Congress’s power to treat couples as married even 
though some states would not and also to ignore marriages that would 
be valid under state law.404 Yet the Court insisted that ordinary 
examples of federal-state divergence over lawful marriage were 
“limited” and were designed to “further federal policy.”405 By contrast, 
the Court saw DOMA as rejecting “the long-established precept that 
the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all 
married couples within each State.”406 
In a strange double-pivot, the Court first discarded its own 
federalism analysis as dicta, explaining that “it is unnecessary to decide 
whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the 
 
 399. Id. at 2692, 2695. 
 400. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added); id. at 2692 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
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Constitution	.	.	.	because it disrupts the federal balance.”407 Then the 
Court switched again, declaring that “[t]he State’s power in defining 
the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from 
principles of federalism.”408 
This “non-federalism federalism” argument understandably 
confused many commentators,409 but the Court’s approach may be 
analogous to “governmental interests” analysis under choice of law.410 
Windsor emphasized the “status” conferred by state same-sex 
marriages as a communitarian “recognition, dignity, and protection of 
the class.”411 The Court reasoned that New York’s recognition of same-
sex marriages “reflects both the community’s considered perspective 
on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving 
understanding of the meaning of equality.”412 In a case about conflicts 
of law—which Windsor technically was not—these factors might have 
bolstered New York’s interest in applying its own broad definition of 
marriage instead of the narrower federal standard. 
The Court’s choice-of-law language might also clarify its decision 
not to use modern “tiers of scrutiny,” which are typically used in liberty 
and equality cases to analyze the existence of certain kinds of 
governmental interests.413 The Windsor Court never considered 
whether national interests could be found to support the federal 
marriage definition; instead, it held that such unspecified federal 
interests were in any event outweighed by state interests.414 This kind of 
balancing approach does not figure into typical equal protection or due 
process cases, but it is very familiar in conflicts law. What the Windsor 
Court never explained is how a choice-of-law balancing of interests was 
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related to constitutional principles of equality, liberty, federalism, or 
anything else. 
Now that Windsor’s textual arguments have been identified, 
substantive problems appear in each component part. For example, 
although the Court’s liberty and equality arguments stressed that 
DOMA’s “injury and indignity” had “deprive[d]” same-sex couples of 
rights, those statements lack context. Almost all of the laws that make 
married people “married”—including solemnization, divorce, child 
custody, property rules, wills and estates, evidentiary privileges, 
medical visitation, contractual rights, consumer benefits, state taxation, 
litigation procedures, and a great deal more—are prescribed by state 
law, not federal law.415 And even though DOMA affected “over 1,000 
[federal] statutes” that governed marital status in various federal 
contexts, DOMA did not affect the 10,000 or more state regulations 
governing marital status.416 The Court fretted over details of federal 
ethics law, federal educational loans, and federal veterans’ cemeteries, 
yet DOMA altered only a tiny part of the massive and multilayered 
rules that define what it is to be “legally married.”417 
DOMA’s exclusively federal scope also deflates Windsor’s visceral 
language about personal humiliation, because the “daily lives” of 
“families in their community” have always been built upon thick webs 
of state-law rules and extralegal society.418 Marriage—putting aside its 
significance for personal commitment and love—concerns one’s 
neighbors, relatives, local community, and state-law regulations much 
more than it turns on federal cemeteries and the estate tax.419 
The Court’s references to federalism and choice-of-law-federalism 
are similarly unsound. In the realm of federal statutory law, Congress 
has no constitutional obligation to accept state-law definitions of 
marriage. This includes immigration, social security, any federal-law 
context, or indeed every federal-law context. It makes no constitutional 
difference that DOMA implemented federal-law definitions through a 
sweeping definitional statute, rather than amending each particular 
statute one at a time. So long as Congress had federal power to enact 
the estate tax in the first place, the Constitution did not require federal 
definitions of married beneficiaries to mirror state law. Absent some 
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connection to questions of individual rights, the Windsor Court’s 
theories of federalism and choice of law had no “central relevance” 
whatsoever.420 
Turning to equal protection, the Windsor majority held that 
DOMA was “motived by an improper animus or purpose,” but such 
animus was presumed rather than proved.421 The Court stressed that 
DOMA had excluded all marriages and spouses involving same-sex 
couples from federal statutory law, yet DOMA also excluded all 
marriages and spouses involving trios, quartets, or nonhuman 
participants. What the Court avoided explaining is why the exclusion of 
same-sex couples was constitutionally “improper” and therefore 
different from other statutory exclusions.422 Windsor was thus a great 
victory for LGBT couples, but the Court’s opinion said almost nothing 
about such people’s constitutional status or characteristics. 
As a matter of longstanding doctrine, “heightened scrutiny” is the 
constitutional mechanism for courts in both liberty and equality cases 
to demand substantial justifications for governmental regulations.423 
The Court made no effort in Windsor to explain or even identify the 
need to apply heightened scrutiny. Yet if the Court applied “rational 
basis scrutiny” by default, it is difficult to understand why DOMA 
would be invalid when so many other policies that are based—at least 
in part—on personal beliefs or animus are routinely upheld in other 
contexts.424 
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2.  Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings 
To repeat what is obvious, I would not propose to criticize 
Windsor simply for the sake of doing so. The opinion has textual 
problems, but that is ordinary for a high court that hears only the 
nation’s hardest cases. It is the combination of Windsor’s textual flaws 
and precedential importance that justifies using interpretive methods 
and materials outside the opinion itself. The difficulty of specifying 
precedential meaning and the cultural need to do so are what define 
iconic cases to justify interpretive techniques beyond textualism.425 
Understanding Windsor’s ambiguities is important not only because 
that decision is a leading precedent on LGBT equality and “animus,” 
but also because Windsor is a uniquely significant episode for 
understanding Obergefell. Accordingly, this subsection will examine 
Windsor’s original history, including evidence from lawyers and judges 
to identify the decision’s “implied meaning,” and evidence from 
contemporary observers to explain its “understood meaning.” 
a. Lawyers 
Windsor’s case reached the Supreme Court as a culmination of 
twenty years of gay-rights litigation. The DOMA statute was a reaction 
to a Hawaiian state-court decision protecting same-sex couples, and the 
United States Supreme Court had also moved toward protecting sexual 
orientation and sexual relationships.426 Same-sex marriage was a fierce 
political battleground, and Windsor seemed like a case that, alongside 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,427 would finally resolve matters. As a matter of 
litigative context, such expectations and resources make Windsor’s 
textual shortcomings even more interesting. 
Edie Windsor’s case was distinctively potent because her 
biography embodied personal sacrifice and upper-class respectability.428 
Her legal team included a prestigious New York firm as well as the 
ACLU, and the case even drew support from the federal government, 
her ostensible adversary.429 Windsor’s companion case, Hollingsworth, 
directly challenged whether a state could exclude same-sex couples 
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from its legal definition of marriage.430 Hollingsworth had its own 
sympathetic plaintiffs, its own extraordinary lawyers, and its own flock 
of amicus briefs.431 Against this background, it is hard to construct any 
circumstances that could have more forcefully presented the legal 
questions surrounding same-sex marriage than Windsor and 
Hollingsworth. 
Lawyers in the two cases addressed every legal and factual issue 
imaginable. Doctrinal questions such as the meaning of Lawrence and 
Romer, the applicable tier of scrutiny, and analogies to Brown and 
Loving v. Virginia; sociological claims about interrelationships among 
marriage and sex and childrearing; cultural issues of how marriage laws 
could affect perceptions of the institution; the social status of gays, 
lesbians, and their children; structural concerns over the role of 
constitutional adjudication in a democracy; all of these and more were 
exhaustively briefed with remarkable skill.432 
Most importantly, Windsor and Hollingsworth offered a 
distinctively wide range of possible outcomes. At its preference, the 
Court could have upheld or invalidated DOMA and/or California’s 
marriage law, and it could have done so through opinions of any 
conceivable breadth or narrowness. In the case that became 
Hollingsworth, the Ninth Circuit ruled on grounds that invalidated only 
California’s same-sex marriage ban—a so-called “one-state solution.”433 
The United States argued that California and seven other states had 
violated equal protection by granting substantive benefits to gay and 
lesbian couples but denying nominal marital status—this was an “eight-
state solution.”434 Or the Court could have applied heightened 
constitutional scrutiny to invalidate all state barriers against same-sex 
marriage—a “fifty-state solution.” 
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Windsor was discussed by lawyers and the general public as if it 
would be a landmark case, yet the Court studiously avoided every 
constitutional issue concerning state marriage laws. Windsor explicitly 
declined to address state definitions of marriage,435 and Hollingsworth 
ruled five to four that the litigants lacked standing to pursue their 
appeal.436 In both decisions, the Court said nothing about state laws 
that excluded same-sex marriage, and Kennedy’s Hollingsworth dissent 
maintained that same silence.437 From an originalist perspective, 
Windsor and Hollingsworth were cases of immense force that somehow 
managed to shrink on their day of judgment. The interpretive gap 
between Windsor’s potential and its textual reality made the case 
controversial and also useful as a focal point for constitutional 
debate.438 
b. Judges 
No one can analyze Windsor’s textual ambiguities without 
considering the opinion’s author, Justice Kennedy. Kennedy may not 
be a grand figure like Story or Brandeis—hardly anyone is—but he has 
written every Court decision addressing gay rights for twenty years, 
and his personal connection to such cases is hard to overstate.439 Each 
opinion has taken small steps toward protecting lesbians and gays, 
while also refusing to discuss the full implications of doing so. For 
example, Kennedy’s Romer opinion about sexual-orientation 
discrimination did not consider the constitutionality of banning 
sodomy.440 His opinion in Lawrence protected sodomy, but refused to 
address same-sex marriage.441 In Windsor, Kennedy led the Court even 
closer to protecting same-sex marriage across the board, yet once again 
his opinion stopped short.442 
Although the fact is often ignored, Kennedy publicly addressed 
gay rights long before he wrote opinions for the Supreme Court. Just 
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three weeks after Bowers v. Hardwick was decided in 1986,443 then-
Judge Kennedy spoke to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal 
Studies in an address entitled “Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates 
of Judicial Restraint.”444 The speech was featured in Kennedy’s 
confirmation hearings after the Senate rejected arch-conservative 
Robert Bork,445 and it yields three overlapping ways that Kennedy’s 
biography can illuminate Windsor’s ambiguities. 
A first approach concerns Kennedy’s image as a cosmopolitan 
advocate for human rights.446 His 1986 speech paid close attention to 
the Canadian Constitution and case law from the European Court of 
Human Rights. The European court had protected same-sex sodomy 
based on rights concerning “respect for	.	.	.	private and family life.”447 
Kennedy would much later cite this decision to justify a similar result 
under the United States Constitution.448 Yet even in 1986, Kennedy 
argued that basic constitutional issues were similar in Europe and the 
United States, despite the absence of any explicit language in the 
American Constitution about “privacy,” “family life,” or “private” 
rights.449 
Kennedy’s speech described Bowers with an ambivalence that 
referenced political philosophy: “Many argue that a just society grants 
a right to engage in homosexual conduct. If that view is accepted, the 
Bowers decision in effect says that the State of Georgia has the right to 
make a wrong decision.	.	.	.”450 During confirmation hearings, Kennedy 
explained his constitutional approach in explicitly multinational terms: 
The framers had an idea which is central to Western 
thought.	.	.	.	It is central to the idea of the rule of law. That is 
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there is a zone of liberty, a zone of protection	.	.	.	where the 
individual can tell the Government: Beyond this line you may 
not go.451  
As Kennedy had written in 1986: “I am particularly gratified to 
meet	.	.	.	my Canadian colleagues. We share the commitment to a rule 
of law; and it is a great privilege for me to further my understanding of 
the constitutional process by sharing in these discussions.”452 
Alongside other biographical evidence about foreign and 
international law,453 Kennedy’s discussion of gay rights in 1986 suggests 
that European and Commonwealth law provided important context for 
all of the Supreme Court precedents that led up to Windsor. In turn, as 
future debates over same-sex marriage expand to encompass different 
forms of sexual liberty and LGBT equality, Windsor’s doctrinal 
meaning may be illuminated by analyzing comparable developments in 
the European and Anglophone world. 
A second approach to Kennedy’s biography concerns his 
generational link to the legal-process movement. As a Harvard student 
from 1958 to 1961, Kennedy learned law at the epicenter of this school 
of thought.454 Legal-process jurisprudence—as compared with legal 
realism or Warren-era rights protection—focused on achieving 
institutional legitimacy through the division of labor among various 
levels of government and different kinds of legal actors.455 
Such themes were apparent in Kennedy’s speech. As he 
elaborated the “dictates” of judicial restraint, Kennedy explained that 
“the judicial method” requires judges “to decide specific cases, from 
which general propositions later evolve.”456 Judges need not resort to 
unenumerated rights as “a necessary antidote to the potential excesses 
of a democratic majority.”457 “[T]he political branches themselves” are 
more important, incorporating “checks of bicameralism, the executive 
veto, and the division of sovereignty between state and federal 
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government.”458 Time and again, Kennedy stressed courts’ limited role 
in pursuing social ideals and assuring social benefits. He claimed that 
activist judicial conduct undermines courts’ own legitimacy while it also 
“erodes the initiative” of responsible political actors.459 With respect to 
Bowers and sodomy, Kennedy therefore concluded that: 
Georgia’s right to be wrong in matters not specifically controlled 
by the Constitution is a necessary component of its own political 
processes. Its citizens have the political liberty to	.	.	.	make 
decisions that might be wrong in the ideal sense, subject to 
correction in the ordinary political process.460 
This notion of compromising substantive justice in favor of systemic 
credibility was a hallmark of that conservative generation of legal-
process scholarship.461 
A similar focus on institutional arrangements led one modern 
commentator to call Windsor an act of “mad genius,” and perhaps from 
a legal-process perspective it was.462 Windsor produced the narrowest 
judicial opinion possible and yielded a bare minimum of constitutional 
equality. The Court granted flexibility to political branches, while 
simultaneously invoking structural ideas of decentralized federalism to 
define who counts as “legally married.” Without clarifying the 
substantive law of same-sex marriage, Windsor took its constitutional 
stand on the mild institutional thesis that states should decide marriage 
issues, not Congress. The Windsor opinion thus echoed Kennedy’s 
earlier belief that “[t]he judicial method	.	.	.	is the surest safeguard of 
liberty,”463 as opposed to expansive recognition of unenumerated 
rights. From this point of view, Windsor might support judicial reliance 
on notions of constitutional structure—however hazy or ill-conceived—
if courts could thereby dodge or delay adjudicating new forms of 
individual rights. 
A third approach to Kennedy’s biography would cast him as the 
muddled, center-right compromiser that one might expect from an 
immediately post-Bork judicial nominee. Perhaps there is no deep 
principle undergirding Windsor’s half-steps—neither international legal 
opinion nor legal-process jurisprudence. Perhaps Windsor’s paragraph 
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about United States history could be viewed as its author’s closeted 
autobiography: 
[U]ntil recent years, many citizens had not even considered the 
possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to 
occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman 
in lawful marriage.	.	.	.	[M]arriage between a man and a woman 
no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the 
very definition of that term and to its role and function 
throughout the history of civilization. That belief, for many who 
long have held it, became even more urgent, more cherished 
when challenged. For others, however, came the beginnings of a 
new perspective, a new insight.464 
In this sense, Kennedy’s stepwise rulings about LGBT rights might 
approximate what the author believed at the time—an “evolution” in 
hindsight, but something more chaotic in actual lived experience. 
Confusion and paradox were also themes of Kennedy’s 1986 
speech. In a partial defense of unenumerated rights, Kennedy insisted 
that “[i]t forts constitutional dynamics, and it defies the pre[ce]dential 
method to announce in a categorical way that there can be no 
unenumerated rights.”465 Yet he immediately replied that “it is 
imprudent as well to say that there are broadly defined categories of 
unenumerated rights, and to say so apart from the factual premises of 
decided cases.”466 True to his word, Kennedy’s speech offered no 
general criteria or standards for determining when or why 
unenumerated rights might comport with his “dictates of judicial 
restraint.”467 
Kennedy was similarly vague in his confirmation hearings. “[T]he 
great question in constitutional law is [sic]: One, where is that line [of 
constitutional liberty] drawn? And, two, what are the principles that 
you refer to in drawing that line.”468 Without providing any reassurance 
or clarification, Kennedy reiterated how courts proceed in defining 
constitutional liberty: “There is a line. It is wavering; it is amorphous; it 
is uncertain. But this is the judicial function.”469 In 1986, Kennedy 
almost celebrated constitutional unpredictability: “I am unconcerned 
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that there is a zone of ambiguity, even one of tension, between the 
courts and the political branches	.	.	.	. Uncertainty is itself a restraint on 
the political branch, causing it to act with deliberation and with 
conscious reference to constitutional principles.”470 
Some modern commentators might characterize this sort of 
“incomplete theorization” as desirable, while others might 
acknowledge without praise a politically centrist Justice who led a 
politically centrist Court toward coherence with politically centrist 
public opinion.471 Irrespective of normative judgments, this last 
interpretation of Kennedy’s biographical context suggests that Windsor 
was ambivalent in its reasoning and implications because its author was 
as well. And the opinion might be narrowly and clumsily drawn 
because, for better and for worse, such stumbling incrementalism had 
become Kennedy’s thirty-year habit in the dynamic field of same-sex 
rights. 
c. Contemporary Reactions 
Contemporary observers’ reactions are a third set of originalist 
material that describes Windsor’s understood meaning when it was 
decided. And although the recent sources discussed herein may feel 
more like “news” than “history,” their role concerning precedential 
interpretation is quite similar to what we have seen with Swift and Erie. 
Windsor was a widely anticipated, front-page story with consistent 
coverage across print and electronic venues as a landmark decision that 
would have an immediate and huge impact.472 Journalists compared the 
decision to the nation’s first legislation protecting sexual orientation, to 
President Obama’s decision to support same-sex marriage, and even to 
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Brown v. Board of Education.473 After the Court’s ruling, the national 
press covered public celebrations and supportive demonstrations, 
which yielded dramatic visual images and personal stories.474 
Even Hollingsworth’s decision to deny standing was viewed as a 
victory for marriage equality because it left intact a district court 
judgment favoring same-sex marriage.475 California officials proclaimed 
that judgment to be legally effective across the state, thereby delivering 
a massive political victory for same-sex equality in America’s most 
populous state.476 
Legal commentators were slightly more conflicted about Windsor, 
but substantive criticism was modest.477 Almost all academics viewed 
Windsor as a way station toward full protection for same-sex 
marriage,478 and almost no one challenged that result as incorrect. 
Instead, the prevailing intellectual questions were how and whether to 
enlist Windsor’s equality and liberty arguments in other constitutional 
battles over race, gender, and sexual orientation.479 
To assess Windsor’s original meaning, one must remember that 
the Court’s judicial text did not appear in a vacuum. Public and legal 
commentators had struggled for months to understand what the 
unannounced decision might mean.480 Kennedy wrote Windsor against 
that discursive backdrop, and like every other Justice, he was also an 
occupant of the same political and cultural world that would receive 
and interpret the Court’s ultimate decision. 
The complex relationship between authors and audiences is 
familiar from “ordinary meaning originalism” in constitutional 
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analysis.481 Using similar methods in this context shows that the public, 
press, and legal community immediately minimized Windsor’s technical 
details and federalist limitations. The decision was viewed by the public 
as a major step toward the now-inevitable conclusion that same-sex 
marriage would be constitutionally protected. Given the breadth of 
that reaction, and the corresponding power of national cultural politics, 
the Court could not have been at all surprised. 
3.  Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning 
But what was unexpected was Windsor’s broad and rapid 
application in state and federal courts. During the two years following 
Windsor, almost one hundred state and federal cases about same-sex 
marriage were filed in thirty-two states, and nearly every judicial 
decision ruled in favor of protecting same-sex marriage.482 Even though 
Windsor’s text insisted that it did not decide anything with respect to 
state laws, and even as commentators braced themselves for the “next 
case” that would finish the job, state and federal judges across the 
country held that further instructions were unnecessary.483 They 
believed that the Windsor Court had done what it did not dare to say, 
announcing and affirming constitutional principles that implied full 
legal protection for same-sex marriages notwithstanding federal- or 
state-law restrictions. 
No federal court had protected same-sex marriage before the 
litigation in Windsor and Hollingsworth began, but a great many did so 
afterwards—citing Windsor at every turn.484 One commentator has 
written that “[t]he pace of change on same-sex marriage, in both 
popular opinion and in the courts, has no parallel in the nation’s 
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history.”485 Windsor’s developmental history shows that the decision 
was both a product of that shift and a major catalyst reinforcing it. As 
once-hesitant judges surged forward to protect marriage equality, 
exceeding observers’ expectations, it was obvious to everyone that 
Windsor—just like other iconic cases—meant a great deal more than 
one could read from the Court’s slip opinions. 
For a brief time, Windsor was an iconic case not so different from 
Swift or Erie. The Court had explicitly resolved one set of crucial 
questions, but its tantalizing and dubious reasoning led lawyers to 
wonder whether the decision signified more than the opinion 
explained. This is how Windsor became a focal point for constitutional 
debate: as a few interpreters read the case narrowly by relying on its 
text, and other interpreters read it broadly based on the decision’s 
implied and understood meanings.486 
B. Obergefell v. Hodges: Iconic et Cetera 
After two short years, the Court wrote Windsor’s developmental 
meaning into Obergefell’s text. Not only did the Court endorse broad 
constitutional protection for same-sex marriage, as Windsor had 
implied, but the Court also cited as support lower-court decisions that 
had reached that same conclusion by interpreting Windsor 
nontextually.487 The rapid feedback loop—from the Windsor decision, 
to other courts’ expansion of Windsor, and then to Obergefell’s 
adoption of that expansion—is distinctive if not unique in the Supreme 
Court’s history.488 It is also an example of how an iconic precedent’s 
meaning can diverge from the opinion’s text. 
Despite Windsor’s doctrinal and cultural importance during its 
moment, Obergefell suggests that the decision may not remain iconic 
for long. Such reformulation has occurred with many other leading 
Supreme Court cases: Brown absorbed the memory of McLaurin v. 
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Oklahoma in the context of segregation,489 Loving overwhelmed 
McLaughlin v. Florida with respect to miscegenation,490 and now 
Windsor may join Romer and even Lawrence as transitional cases on 
the doctrinal path to Obergefell.491 Windsor remains the Court’s most 
important holding about “animus,” and it may yet imply broad 
protections based on sexual orientation.492 But the decision’s most 
enduring significance may be its role in producing and supporting 
Obergefell. 
This Section proposes that even Obergefell’s decision will not end 
the doctrinal story. On the contrary, the interpretive patterns discussed 
in this Article will recur yet again. Lawyers, judges, and commentators 
will seek to interpret the newly iconic decision in Obergefell, which 
resolved doctrinal debates over same-sex marriage, but which raised 
unanswered questions concerning LGBT discrimination, polygamy, 
and other forms of constitutional liberty. Where the Court’s Obergefell 
opinion is textually vague or unsatisfactory—as measured against 
whatever subsequent interpreters wish to learn from it—the decision’s 
implied meaning and understood meaning will be identified using 
historical resources such as litigative context, judicial biography, and 
contemporary reactions. Over time, struggles about Obergefell’s 
implications will yield developmental meanings that differ from what 
the case meant at the start. Throughout this process, the decision’s 
precedential force will attract strong attention and debate, much like 
Erie, Marbury, Brown, Windsor, and so many other precedential icons. 
Although many historical materials surrounding Obergefell have not 
yet emerged, one can already see that the same interpretive patterns 
will structure legal struggles over what that decision means. 
1.  Textualism: Declared Meaning 
Jim Obergefell was just one of thirty plaintiffs whose suits were 
decided together by the Supreme Court, but his case presented 
especially notable facts.493 Obergefell’s partner, John Arthur, was in 
hospice care suffering from ALS when the Court decided Windsor v. 
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United States. That same day, Obergefell leaned over and proposed to 
Arthur with a hug and a kiss.494 Because same-sex marriage was illegal 
in Ohio, and because Arthur’s mobility was so limited, the couple’s 
wedding occurred in a medical transport plane as it sat on the tarmac in 
Maryland.495 Three months later, Arthur died in Ohio, and Obergefell 
filed suit so that the death certificate would reflect his status as a 
surviving spouse.496 Obergefell challenged Ohio’s failure to recognize 
his out-of-state marriage on due process and equal protection grounds, 
while plaintiffs in other cases constitutionally challenged governmental 
refusals to marry them in their own home states.497 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of all the Obergefell plaintiffs 
by a vote of five to four, and as with Windsor, Justice Kennedy wrote 
the majority opinion.498 Entirely absent were Windsor’s tortured 
arguments about federalism and conflicts of law.499 Instead, Obergefell 
exclusively concerned the relationship between constitutional liberty 
and equality. 
The Court held that marriage is part of the liberty “to define and 
express” one’s “identity.”500 Acknowledging a historical 
“understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the 
opposite sex,” the Court based its conclusion on four enumerated 
reasons that “marriage is fundamental.”501 First, as a matter of 
individual autonomy, the choice to marry—like “contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing”—“shape[s] an individual’s 
destiny” and “self-definition,” while also leading to “other freedoms, 
such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”502 Second, as a bilateral 
commitment, the right to marriage “dignifies couples” in their mutual 
loyalty, while the practical “companionship and understanding” of 
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married life “responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might 
call out only to find no one there.”503 
Third, the Court described marriage as crucial for bearing and 
rearing children. In addition to providing “permanency and stability,” 
the Court characterized marriage as a symbol to children about “the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other 
families in their community.”504 Fourth, the Court celebrated marriage 
as “a keystone of our social order” and “a building block of our 
national community.”505 This is why marriage as a “public institution” 
entails significant advantages under federal law and a massive number 
of state-law benefits.506 
Having defined “the fundamental right to marry” based on these 
function-oriented principles, the Court held that excluding same-sex 
marriage “demeans or stigmatizes” individuals, “disparage[s] their 
choices and diminish[es] their personhood,” and therefore denies their 
constitutional liberty.507 After all, the Court declared, the petitioners’ 
“immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real 
path to this profound commitment.”508 
Alongside the Court’s four points about constitutional liberty, 
Obergefell also noted the inequality of treating same-sex couples 
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differently from opposite-sex couples.509 Thus, the Court concluded 
that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates both due process and equal 
protection: 
Rights implicit in liberty and	.	.	.	equal protection	.	.	.	are not 
always co-extensive,	.	.	.	[yet] each may be instructive as to the 
meaning and reach of the other.	.	.	.	This interrelation of the two 
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and 
must become.510 
Obergefell produced a much broader result than Windsor, and the 
Court addressed issues of liberty and equality more directly than it had 
done two years earlier. Yet Windsor and Obergefell resemble other 
iconic cases insofar as the Court’s basic holdings—invalidating first 
DOMA and then state same-sex marriage bans—raised collateral 
doctrinal questions that are both important and open to interpretation. 
In Obergefell, for example, the Court double-fortified its 
constitutional analysis by simultaneously relying on liberty and 
equality. But the Court did not explain how far either of those 
principles should extend. Instead, the Court augmented doctrinal 
uncertainty by emphasizing that attitudes, institutions, and 
constitutional decisions can sometimes change dramatically.511 The 
 
 509. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (“This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual 
orientation. There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to 
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.” (citation omitted)); id. at 
2600 (“[S]ame-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate 
association.”); id. at 2601–02 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex 
couples with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, 
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to 
marriage	.	.	.	.	[E]xclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians 
are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them 
out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”); see also id. at 2600 (“Excluding same-
sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry. 
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability [that] marriage offers, their children 
suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”). 
 510. Id. at 2602–03 (citations omitted). 
 511. E.g., id. at 2595 (“[D]evelopments in the institution of marriage over the past 
centuries	.	.	.	.	worked deep transformations in its structure affecting aspects of marriage 
long viewed by many as essential.”); id. at 2596 (“[N]ew dimensions of freedom become 
apparent to new generations	.	.	.	.”); id. (describing twentieth-century experiences with the 
rights of gays and lesbians as including “a quite extensive discussion	.	.	.	in both 
governmental and private sectors and	.	.	.	a shift in public attitudes toward greater 
tolerance”); id. at 2598 (explaining that, with respect to much constitutional law, “[h]istory 
and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. That 
method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the 
present. The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times”); id. 
(“The Court, like many institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time 
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Court specifically denied, “both with respect to the right to marry and 
the rights of gays and lesbians,” that rights should be “defined by who 
exercised them in the past.”512 And after issuing that seemingly 
antiprecedential proclamation, the Court gave little guidance about 
what kinds of “new insights” or “understandings” might arise 
concerning liberty or equality in future cases.513 
The Court’s declared meaning in Obergefell permits several 
textual interpretations. Perhaps the case should apply to many forms of 
LGBT rights, thereby highlighting the Court’s references to sexual 
orientation as “immutable.”514 Under that scenario, every state-
imposed effort to “demean,” “stigmatize,” “harm,” or otherwise 
discriminate based on sexual orientation might be presumptively 
unconstitutional.515 This could be called a “heightened scrutiny” 
interpretation of Obergefell, although the Court did not use that 
technical term.516 
Or maybe Obergefell is a case just about marriage, with no 
immediate implications for LGBT equality in housing, employment, 
public accommodations, or elsewhere. This approach would emphasize 
the Court’s claim that marriage has “transcendent” if not “unique” 
importance.517 This “marriage-only” interpretation of Obergefell might 
plausibly apply to opposite-sex polygamy under the Constitution 
before it would invalidate other kinds of discrimination against gays 
and lesbians. 
A third possibility is that Obergefell represents an expansion of 
liberty in widely various contexts. Marriage is certainly not the only 
individual decision that affects one’s “autonomy,” “dignity,” “identity,” 
or “self-definition.”518 And Obergefell’s dismissive approach to 
Washington v. Glucksberg may be suggestive.519 The Court in 
Glucksberg had rejected some plaintiffs’ claimed right to assisted 
suicide, thereby requiring that any kind of protected constitutional 
 
of which it is a part.” (citation omitted)); id. at 2603 (“[N]ew insights and societal 
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality.”). 
 512. Id. at 2602. 
 513. Id. at 2596. 
 514. Id. 
 515. Id. at 2601–02. 
 516. Cf. supra notes 423–424 and accompanying text (describing the absence of 
heightened-scrutiny review in Windsor). 
 517. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94. 
 518. Id. at 2598–99 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–
55 (Mass. 2003)). 
 519. Id. at 2602. 
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liberty must incorporate a conservative and “careful description” of 
fundamental rights.520 In Obergefell, the Court explained, without at all 
endorsing Glucksberg, that whereas the Court’s earlier approach “may 
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-
assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has 
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and 
intimacy.”521 
2.  Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings 
As a textual matter, the Court’s Obergefell opinion is chock-full of 
newly articulated principles, broadly construed precedents, and 
history’s transformation by new ideas. The practical importance of the 
Court’s protection for same-sex marriage is obvious, but the decision’s 
precedential meaning remains unclear. From the opinion’s text, 
Obergefell might be a pivotal case for LGBT equality, the fundamental 
right to marry, constitutional liberty including assisted suicide, or all of 
these at once; it also could be a case that protects same-sex marriage 
and nothing more. 
Comparable to other iconic precedents, Obergefell’s text alone 
cannot answer important questions about the decision’s meaning. We 
shall see that lawyers and judges in the aftermath are already arguing 
over whether Obergefell—like Windsor—means more than it said. And 
important evidence for such debates will encompass implied and 
understood meanings from the decision’s originalist context. 
a. Lawyers 
There are many superficial similarities between Windsor and 
Obergefell, including, in both contexts, similar constitutional arguments 
and a concentration of legal resources. The constitutional landscape 
entirely changed, however, in the years between the two lawsuits. 
When the plaintiffs originally sued in Windsor and Hollingsworth, 
many observers thought that seeking constitutional protection for 
same-sex marriage would result in a dangerous appeal to a socially 
conservative Court.522 By comparison, the plaintiffs and lawyers in 
Obergefell were engaged in something closer to a mop-up project. 
 
 520. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 521. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added). 
 522. See ROBERTA KAPLAN WITH LISA DICKEY, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED 
STATES V. WINDSOR AND THE DEFEAT OF DOMA 117–18 (2015) (discussing concerns 
within the LGBT community that litigation would set back the movement); Douglas 
NeJaime, The View From Below: Public Interest Lawyering, Social Change, and 
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Immediately in the summer of 2013, the cultural force of 
Windsor’s victory and Hollingsworth’s semi-victory was so great that 
even nonlawyers could feel the decisions’ influence.523 By the time the 
Sixth Circuit denied the claims of Obergefell and other plaintiffs, their 
lawyers were so confident of Supreme Court success that they did not 
seek en banc review from the court of appeals.524 Such confidence also 
helps explain why the Obergefell litigants—unlike those in Windsor—
were all committed to a “fifty-state solution,” whereas the cautious 
lawyers who litigated Windsor also advocated “eight-state” and “one-
state” solutions.525 Arguments that same-sex marriage represented “the 
right side of history” were certainly prevalent in 2013,526 but two years 
later, it seemed that such historical progress was fully ripe for 
application in the Supreme Court. 
Evidence of Obergefell’s implied meaning based on the litigating 
lawyers’ conduct supports a narrow view of the decision’s textual 
ambiguities: protecting same-sex marriage to be sure, but not 
polygamy, general LGBT equality, or broad multicontextual liberty. 
 
Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 182, 191, 195 (2013) (discussing LGBT 
groups who urged that Proposition 8 not be challenged in federal court for fear of what the 
Supreme Court might do); Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 
2010, at 40 (quoting statement of William Eskridge) (“A question that so evenly but 
intensely divides the country is not one that should be decided by the courts 
nationwide	.	.	.	.	It is just not something that this Supreme Court is going to deliver on at 
this point.”); On The Media: Plaintiff Shopping (WNYC radio broadcast Oct. 9, 2015) 
(quoting statement of Kris Perry, the named plaintiff in Hollingsworth) (“[W]e were semi-
panicked the entire time over not prevailing and being the posterchildren of a failed effort 
that, you know, despite every effort being made to do a good job, not persuading a 
judge.”). 
 523. E.g., supra note 494 and accompanying text. 
 524. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2015). Appellate advocates 
ordinarily seek justice for their clients in any tribunal, and conventional wisdom might 
have viewed a petition for en banc review followed by a petition for certiorari as offering 
two chances to win instead of just one. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit did have five 
judges appointed by a Democratic President, as compared with ten appointed by a 
Republican President, including eight appointed by George W. Bush. See Judges of The 
Court—Sixth Circuit, 772 F.3d, at X–XI (2015) (listing names, geographical locations, and 
appointment dates of Sixth Circuit judges serving at the time); 2 ALMANAC OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 6th Cir. i–126 (Susan Alexander ed., 2015) (profiling federal 
judges sitting on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 525. Cf. supra notes 433–434 and accompanying text (discussing the different litigative 
approach taken in Hollingsworth). The only potential fallback position in Obergefell 
concerned the claim in Obergefell’s own case that, even if unwilling states were not 
themselves required to recognize same-sex marriage, they at least must recognize same-
sex marriages that were properly solemnized in other states. 
 526. E.g., Michelle Boorstein & Annie Gowen, Scouting World Divided on 
Reconsideration of Gay Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2013, at A3; Opinion Shift on Gay 
Marriage Hard for Justices To Ignore, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE, June 17, 2013. 
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Thus, for example, no brief in Obergefell argued for protecting 
polygamy or other currently illegal forms of marriage.527 No brief 
argued for physician-assisted suicide, prostitution, or any other 
expansive constitutional liberty.528 And although both sides understood 
the potential impact of applying “intermediate scrutiny” to sexual-
orientation discrimination, the Court’s decision to avoid any form of 
heightened scrutiny arguably proved that Obergefell itself did not 
endorse that result.529 
b. Judges 
Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion—even more than his prior 
judicial work—cemented his status as the Court’s dominant author of 
LGBT rights. Since Bowers v. Hardwick, Kennedy has written four 
majority opinions in such cases, one Justice wrote a single concurrence, 
and no other Justice has written any opinion endorsing claims 
regarding sexual orientation.530 Correspondingly, though one cannot 
yet prove the fact, Kennedy’s opinions about LGBT rights will almost 
certainly be the most memorable legacy from his long judicial career. 
Extending this Article’s earlier biographical analysis to include 
Obergefell yields even more insights than would have been possible two 
years earlier. 
To consider Kennedy’s four opinions concerning LGBT rights as 
an aggregate embodiment of their author’s judicial approach reveals a 
deeper pattern to supplement Obergefell’s textual vagueness. In 1996, 
Kennedy wrote for the Court in Romer v. Evans, invalidating under 
equal protection a statewide ban on antidiscrimination laws protecting 
gays and lesbians.531 The Court did not determine whether statutes that 
disadvantage gays and lesbians require heightened constitutional 
scrutiny across the board. Instead, Kennedy wrote that the particular 
state provision at stake was “inexplicable by anything but animus 
 
 527. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 
14–556); Brief for Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14–
556). 
 528. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 527. 
 529. See id.; cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (declining even to mention constitutional 
tiers of judicial scrutiny); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“When a law exhibits	.	.	.	a desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike 
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 530. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (majority opinion); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 531. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
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toward the class it affects” and thus failed even rational basis review.532 
A major question that remained was whether Romer’s equality ruling 
could be reconciled with Bowers, which had upheld a state 
“homosexual sodomy” ban against a constitutional challenge on liberty 
grounds.533 
In 2003, Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas 
answered that open question from Romer by holding that sodomy laws 
targeting “Homosexual Conduct” violate constitutional liberty.534 The 
Court did not, even as an alternative holding, apply Romer’s “animus” 
principle under equal protection.535 Romer thus came to be known as a 
limited, vague precedent about equal protection that later propelled 
the Court toward broader doctrinal conclusions about on liberty. 
Nevertheless, readers will note that even Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion 
ended with a series of “I’ll Never” scenarios that the Court explicitly 
refused to address—presumably because most of them were 
categorically unprotected by the Constitution: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does 
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition [e.g., 
marriage] to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.536 
The same equality-to-liberty pattern of Romer to Lawrence was 
repeated, over a much faster timeframe, on the road from Windsor to 
Obergefell. Windsor’s narrow invalidation of DOMA was almost 
entirely based on equal protection, despite vague references to liberty 
and constitutional federalism.537 Just like Romer’s equal protection 
ruling, Kennedy’s Windsor opinion claimed that the challenged law was 
“motived by an improper animus or purpose,” and the Court therefore 
 
 532. Id. at 631–32. 
 533. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 534. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion). 
 535. Id. at 574–75 (describing the equal protection argument as “tenable,” but 
declining to endorse it as substantively correct). Justice O’Connor would have preferred to 
invalidate the Texas statute on equality grounds because it was based on nothing more 
than “mere moral disapproval” which like Romer’s “bare	.	.	.	desire to harm” was 
categorically insufficient. Id. at 580, 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Because the Court chose not to endorse that position, Justice O’Connor concurred only 
“in the judgment.” Id. at 579. 
 536. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 537. See supra Section II.A.1. 
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refused to consider any other constitutional issue, including state 
restrictions on same-sex marriage.538 Much like Lawrence following 
Romer, Obergefell’s broader liberty analysis resolved the constitutional 
issue that Windsor had dodged through narrow reliance on “animus” 
and equal protection. 
With Kennedy’s judicial biography as an interpretive lens, this 
pattern embodies Obergefell’s implied meaning from its author’s 
perspective. For twenty years, Kennedy has used equality as a doctrinal 
wedge that he himself has later cited as precedent for broader judicial 
intervention based on liberty. This is not the structural-institutional 
thinking that dominated legal-process scholarship, but it has yielded 
analogous results.539 
Windsor declared that equal protection sometimes makes liberty 
“all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”540 
But perhaps that was less a comment on the inherent nature of liberty 
or equality, and more a memoir of how Kennedy himself has used 
equal protection principles to delay broad judicial decisions and to 
observe the reactions of other political and cultural actors. This could 
explain why Obergefell repeatedly cited public “discussion” of same-
sex couples and their status.541 And it was this slow-paced two-step of 
equality and liberty, over the course of two decades, that finally 
brought Kennedy and the Court to acknowledge in Obergefell “the 
urgency” of demands for LGBT liberty and equality.542 
As though encountering such issues for the first time, Kennedy’s 
Obergefell opinion mentioned the political harm that would result if 
someone like Obergefell were not listed on his partner’s death 
certificate, if two lesbians were unable to exercise full rights as co-
parents, or if other plaintiffs had to wait or travel to obtain a legally 
valid marriage.543 For modern interpreters, this last tension between 
Obergefell’s text and Kennedy’s biographical background—between 
the decision’s declared and implied meanings—may be the most 
interesting of all. 
 
 538. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 632 (1996). 
 539. Cf. supra notes 454–471 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy’s 
connection with legal-process jurisprudence). 
 540. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 541. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97, 2605 (2015). 
 542. Id. at 2594. 
 543. Id. at 2601. 
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As a textual matter, the Court’s opinion described the slow march 
of doctrinal history with a melancholy tone: “Although Bowers was 
eventually repudiated in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in 
the interim, and the substantial effects of these injuries no doubt 
lingered long after Bowers was overruled. Dignitary wounds cannot 
always be healed with the stroke of a pen.”544 A textualist might 
conclude from such language that the Obergefell Court had repented its 
mistakes and that litigants alleging some unspecified category of 
“dignitary wounds” should therefore expect quicker justice in the 
future. But such conclusions would ignore the fact that it was Kennedy 
himself who wrote the very same doctrinal history that his Obergefell 
opinion seemed to lament. If one were truly concerned with “dignitary 
wounds,” then the Court—and Kennedy in particular—could have 
criticized Bowers and sodomy laws in 1996 (Romer), could have 
undermined DOMA in 2003 (Lawrence), could have cast doubt on 
state same-sex marriage laws in 2013 (Windsor), and even in 2015 
(Obergefell) could have criticized countless episodes of discrimination 
against LGBT persons, couples, and families outside the marriage 
context.545 
Obergefell correctly states that the Supreme Court, “like many 
institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time of 
which it is a part.”546 But the Court, and especially the swing-voting 
Justice Kennedy, has played important roles in shaping its world and 
time. In moments of legal dispute—such as Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, 
and Obergefell—the Court’s choice about what kind of “assumptions” 
become precedents can make all the difference, as has been true for 
courts throughout our nation’s debate-riddled history. 
These features of Kennedy’s biography make it more difficult to 
view Obergefell as a broad precedent that implicitly supports polygamy 
or physician-assisted suicide.547 Although both of those practices have 
plausible connections to the Court’s textual principles of “autonomy,” 
 
 544. Id. at 2606. 
 545. One cannot predict whether any of Kennedy’s liberal-progressive peers would 
have joined him in reaching such conclusions, but it is likely that even a lone concurrence 
by Kennedy would have accelerated the judicial vindication of constitutional rights that 
were in fact announced years or decades later. 
 546. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 547. With respect to physician-assisted suicide, however, one should take notice of 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–70 (2006). In that case, Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court upheld Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended 
at OR. REV. STAT. §	127.800–.897 (2013)), based on a vague amalgamation of 
administrative law and federalism. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255–70. 
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“commitment,” “families,” “society,” and “dignitary wounds,” neither 
context has generated the kind of public “discussion” and support that 
Obergefell cited as an important precursor to judicial intervention. Nor 
have they prompted any equality-based warm-up cases similar to 
Romer and Windsor.548 
By comparison, it seems possible that Obergefell could entail 
broader constitutional protection for sexual orientation. Although 
some textualist interpreters will rely on the Court’s unique attention to 
marriage as a precedential limit, Kennedy’s shift from Lawrence to 
Windsor, and from Windsor to Obergefell, demonstrates a notable 
willingness to turn pregnant silence into affirmative doctrine. Applying 
similar logic, Obergefell’s focus on marriage may soon be replaced by 
broader visions of “dignity,” “identity,” and “self-definition” that 
encompass some blend of equality and/or liberty in the workplace, 
housing, public accommodations, or elsewhere—especially if such 
constitutional arguments include sufficient “discussion” and “debate” 
to inspire new forms of “understanding” and “insight.”549 
 
 548. A case concerning a polyamorous reality television family is currently on appeal 
to the Tenth Circuit after a federal district judge held unconstitutional the portions of 
Utah’s criminal polygamy law prohibiting multiple cohabitation, although the state was 
allowed to retain its ban on multiple marriage licenses. Brown v. Herbert, 43 F. Supp. 3d 
1229, 1233 (D. Utah), cert. granted, 10th Cir. No. 14–4117 (Sept. 25, 2014). Unsurprisingly, 
the Browns cite Obergefell throughout their brief, asserting that the Court has rejected 
both the criminalization of private relationships and also legal barriers that are grounded 
in moral and social biases. Brief of Appellees at 16–18, Brown v. Herbert, No. 14–4117 
(10th Cir. filed Aug. 26, 2015) (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584). 
  In a case on appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, the state’s Court of 
Appeals declined to extend Obergefell to the context of physician-assisted suicide, stating 
that the doctrine of judicial restraint requires the exercise of utmost care when extending 
substantive due process to new rights. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. 33,630, 2015 WL 
4757633, at *12 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015), cert. granted, N.M. No. S-1-SC-35478 (Aug. 
31, 2015). Currently, physician-assisted suicide is legal only in Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington, and it is a valid defense to homicide in Montana. Id. at *2.  
 549. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–99, 2602–05 (discussing past and future 
classifications of marriage). One statute that is particularly likely to be challenged in the 
future is Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, which states that “a county, 
municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an 
ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits 
discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.” ARK. CODE ANN. §	14-1-403 (2015). 
At least five Arkansas municipal or county ordinances that “prohibit certain employers 
(and others) from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity” 
have been enacted to date, and a September 1, 2015, opinion from the state’s Attorney 
General concluded that such ordinances are unenforceable under section 14-1-403. Ark. 
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015–088, 2015 WL 5179158. 
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c. Contemporary Reactions: The History of Now 
For now, this is where analysis of Obergefell’s context must end, as 
the decision’s historical arc begins to merge completely with its ongoing 
present. It is too soon for an article like this one to assess reactions to 
Obergefell that indicate the decision’s understood meaning.550 Indeed, 
this Article is one of the contemporary reactions that future 
interpreters might use to apply Obergefell’s understood meaning for 
their own struggles over the iconic case. 
Although the content of Obergefell’s understood meaning cannot 
yet be known—and even less so its developmental meaning—legal 
interpreters will certainly confront the same kinds of historical 
materials and methods that we have seen with respect to Swift, Erie, 
and Windsor. A basic pattern will reappear with Obergefell and any 
other iconic case. Whenever adjudicative power gathers around an 
important precedent, and the Court’s self-explanation seems 
inadequate or incomplete, this Article’s methodology will help 
interpreters clarify and further complicate interpretive debates over 
precedential meaning. 
There can never be an abstract guarantee of interpretive 
resolution, nor even assurance that any sequence of interpretive 
materials will be persuasive.551 On the contrary, just as with statutes 
and constitutions, interpretive methodologies concerning precedents 
can at most yield greater understanding and self-consciousness with 
respect to the case-driven advocacy that underlies so many legal 
disputes.552 
III.  CONCLUSIONS: TURNING THE KALEIDOSCOPE 
In the course of exploring links between law and history, this 
Article also has vital implications for the professional categories of 
legal practice and legal history. Despite occasional overlap, 
practitioners and historians of law are often different people, in 
 
 550. See generally sources cited supra note 390. 
 551. Cf. RODGERS, supra note 10, at 16 (“Should someone try to sell you a piece of 
political goods as an authentic encapsulation of the American political faith, the wise 
course is to run for cover. We have been too conflict-ridden a church to have a creed.”). 
 552. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2604–06 (citing Supreme Court precedents 
that have “expressed principles of broad[] reach” to show that the Court is “[r]esponding 
to a new awareness”), with id. at 2614, 2619–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contesting the 
majority’s interpretation of its cited judicial decisions, and arguing that the “Court’s 
precedents have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent only with its 
traditional meaning”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016) 
480 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
different environments, with different employment imperatives, and 
different standards of success. Thus, for example, some lawyers who 
read this Article will experience its historical details as a burdensome 
weight, even as historians reading the same words might scoff at the 
cursory treatment of a complicated past.553 Notwithstanding such 
divergent reactions and dispositions, I suggest that legal practice and 
legal history are not as separate as one could suppose, and I further 
believe that the greatest work in each field will necessarily involve 
significant engagement with the other. 
It would be quite impossible to explain the full nature of “law” 
and “history” in the space that remains, yet three metaphors may be 
useful for at least a brief sketch.554 Consider law as a field of study that 
is performed with a microscope, as lawyers place preselected 
authorities onto glass slides and bring details into focus. This model of 
legal analysis prizes meticulous attention and comprehensive 
examination, but it also depends on a sharply limited field of view, with 
observable objects that are especially near and easy to manipulate. In 
practice, this model of legal interpretation relies almost entirely on the 
examination of published and easily accessible texts.555 
By comparison, history might be viewed as exploration by 
telescope, using old light from distant stars to describe events that 
happened long ago and far away. Particular historians look at different 
parts of the sky, with different goals and tools. But just as no one can 
see the cosmos all at once, an important historian’s task is to document 
and interrelate particular sets of observations, in the hope of producing 
better astronomical maps and general theories. 
Interpreting iconic cases fits neither of these models very well; 
instead, it is more like looking through a kaleidoscope.556 The tube is 
pointed at something in the world, but there is no hope of seeing that 
 
 553. For every impatient lawyer’s complaint that “no one really cares about Swift 
anymore,” a historian might ask “who can say anything about Obergefell except to express 
one’s own politics?” 
 554. I offer these metaphors with due hesitation. Like historians, legal audiences tend 
to “feel more comfortable in prose. They order things sequentially and argue from effect 
to cause.” Robert Darnton, The Symbolic Element in History, 58 J. MOD. HIST. 218, 220 
(1986). The use of any metaphor requires the author to hope and trust that readers will 
find them meaningful, id. at 222, and it should be obvious that if a metaphor succeeds, that 
success is properly credited to the reader as much as the author. 
 555. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 120 (1984). 
 556. Cf. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 296 (noting, in a very different 
context, “Erie’s kaleidoscopic quality”). 
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external object as it actually is.557 Instead, kaleidoscopes are filled with 
plain objects, such as colored flakes or fluids.558 As the kaleidoscope 
turns, mirrored reflections create patterns and make these interior 
objects seem more magnificent than they would otherwise. 
Kaleidoscopic images of iconic precedents are based in reality, and 
they overlap with one another. The images are always derived from 
shared materials, but the images change subtly and substantially 
without repeating, so there is no single arrangement that can claim 
objective or timeless superiority over the rest. 
The kaleidoscopic metaphor captures many truths about iconic 
precedents, but it overlooks others. Most important, although many 
precedential interpreters “turn the kaleidoscope” to refigure or 
displace existing interpretations of iconic cases, historians and lawyers 
reinterpret iconic precedents for reasons greater than the amusement 
of dancing colors and shimmering light. 
Historians interpret iconic precedents in the pursuit of 
professional and intellectual progress.559 The goal for such academics is 
to say something creative and thoughtful, often by developing or 
unseating other historians’ work.560 Nuance, sophistication, and 
expertise are highly valued, and relationships between legal events and 
other historical evidence are exceedingly important.561 That is why 
some historians would supplement this Article’s categories with even 
more sources of meaning, including a decision’s social effects, cultural 
presumptions, or religious background. In every instance, historians’ 
interpretations are marked by an unshaken focus on the past, which 
also embodies a corresponding emphasis on the forward march of time. 
By contrast, lawyers turn the kaleidoscope of iconic cases to 
advance their interests, their clients’ interests, and sometimes the legal 
system’s interests. Legal audiences are not purely intellectual, and they 
do not admire complexities for their own sake. On the contrary, 
 
 557. This is the sense in which precedential icons do not have scientifically indisputable 
meanings. 
 558. These are cultural forces that create precedential meaning outside of a decision’s 
unobservably essential or objective reality. 
 559. Cf. Friedman, supra note 18, at 253 (“Every generation looks at history through its 
own lens. Something new is constantly getting discovered—new batches of material and, 
more significant, new ways of looking at old or neglected material.”). 
 560. Id. at 253 (“Nothing in life stands still; not even the past. Historians are constantly 
reworking, rethinking, reexamining old assumptions, turning over new rocks, closing off 
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professional imperatives induce judges and lawyers to use precedents, 
and this creates pressure to seek interpretations of iconic cases that are 
themselves usable. Simplicity, legibility, and intercontextual portability 
are at a premium.562 This is why lawyers interpret or misinterpret 
Marbury to prioritize all judicial interpretations of the Constitution, 
Brown to proscribe all racial discrimination, and Erie to require state 
substantive law in all diversity cases.563 Lawyerly interpretations of 
iconic cases—and other authorities—tend to favor smooth surfaces, 
simple holdings, and distortive abstractions from the messiness of life’s 
extralegal experience. 
The goals and professional imperatives of historians and lawyers 
are especially interesting because neither modality can be fully 
separated from the other when it comes to iconic precedents. On one 
side, historians cannot fully describe iconic cases without accounting 
for those decisions’ functionality in a precedential system. Iconic cases 
are always written, read, understood, and applied in the context of a 
professional legal culture; thus, such cases’ meanings cannot be 
abstracted from their legally operative, oversimplifying function as 
precedents. 
By similar coin, lawyers who wish to simplify and operationalize 
iconic precedents cannot entirely supplant the past’s complexity in 
pursuing present and future policies. Doing so would contradict the 
basic premise of a precedential legal system: that the law should “stand 
by” decisions from the past.564 Iconic cases can always be overruled, 
narrowed, massaged, or adjusted. But if the interpretation of an iconic 
decision were to lose all contact with that precedent’s historical reality, 
then that interpretation itself would be inaccurate, inauthentic, and 
therefore illegitimate as a matter of legal doctrine. 
The rule of law is not only about creating forward-looking 
doctrines that are accessible, transferrable, simple, and cheap. Legal 
interpretation also requires a connection to the past events that create 
and embody legal authority. Constitutions and statutes are two 
important examples of concentrated, anchored legal power that is 
derived from past events; iconic precedents are a third. Where current 
legal mandates depend on appeals to prior judicial precedent, historical 
 
 562. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 563. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our 
Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 564. Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Latin ‘to stand by 
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analysis is unavoidable, and it cannot be brushed aside just because it is 
messy. The historian’s call for nuance must confront the lawyer’s 
demand for answers, but a lawyer’s oversimplified distortion risks 
exposure as unpersuasive and literally unbelievable in the face of 
historical critique. 
The mutual compromises of history and law that surround iconic 
precedents can be frustrating or inspiring. Either way, such shared 
sacrifices expose the profound truth that law’s precedential system is 
not today—and has never been—governed purely by forward-looking 
policy or backward-looking history. It has always been an uneasy 
hybrid, and that mixture itself is the product of perpetual debates 
within a complex legal culture that is partly inherited and partly 
manufactured by each successive generation of lawyers and judges. 
This Article’s account of legal precedent may seem complex, and 
that is absolutely the point. Too many lawyers, including this author,565 
have assumed or pretended that the singular meaning of an iconic case 
like Erie can be read exclusively from its judicial text, though Brown 
should serve as an overwhelming counter-example.566 To discern the 
meaning of iconic precedents, no less than to interpret statutes and 
constitutional provisions, can require elaborate effort, and it can also 
generate substantial conflict—both as a matter of substance and 
technique. 
In the field of constitutional interpretation, Justice Souter has 
criticized a “fair reading model” which assumes that “deciding 
constitutional questions should be a straightforward exercise of reading 
fairly and viewing facts objectively.”567 Similar phenomena are even 
more apparent with the interpretation of judicial precedents, and the 
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 566. Compare Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1959) (“Certainly the [Brown] opinion is 
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impulse toward a simple “fair reading” methodology is the same in 
both contexts. “[B]ehind most dreams of a simpler Constitution,” and 
similar dreams of simple judicial precedents, “there lies a basic human 
hunger for the certainty and control that the fair reading model seems 
to promise. And who has not felt that same hunger?”568 However, with 
iconic cases, the Constitution, and many other legal materials, such 
“certainty generally is illusion and repose is not our destiny.”569 
At the very heart of our legal order, the most urgent and vital 
question is how judges and lawyers in “an indeterminate world” can 
maintain what Souter calls “a state of trust,” believing that some “way 
will be found leading through the uncertain future” even as the law’s 
future-oriented trajectory is anchored by precedents from the near and 
distant past.570 This Article’s interpretive methodology hopes to 
indirectly influence how lawyers and judges chart such paths forward. 
At the very least, a better understanding of precedential interpretation 
should help legal agents to recognize the dilemmas they face and the 
techniques that are available on the way. 
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